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Introduction
One of the issues that has been a special concern is how a particular society
is able to reproduce the functional relations of power and dominance that
characterize its existing social and political arrangements . This social
reproduction involves not simply the reproduction of capital and labor, but
also the reproduction of models of social control, including specific social
relationships and specific forms of social consciousness . Antonio Gramsci
(1971) and Raymond Williams (1976), among others refer to this aspect of
social control as ideological hegemony ; and they argue that society
reproduces itself partly through the transmission of a system of values, at-
titudes, beliefs, social practices and norms which function at once to convey
and legitimate the ideology and social practices which serve the interests of
the dominant class in the established order . The dominant world view of the
society is thus perpetuated, in part, by schools as well as by families and
other agencies of socialization . While the dominant world view in American
society is far from monolithic, it nonetheless exercises a powerful influence
in shaping and legitimating social structure and the normative social rela-
tionships of our society as a whole .
Ideological hegemony, thus broadly construed, represents a crucial starting
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point for examining the basic notion of citizenship education, and the
nature of the relationship between schools and the larger society . The role
that schools play as social and economic institutions-i .e., as agents of
social, cultural, and economic reproduction -becomes critically problematic
when the schools are designed to legitimate and reproduce a society that is
marked by enormous inequities in wealth and power, and when the underly-
ing world view is conveyed as citizenship education . The question is whether
we, as educators, intend education for citizenship simply to function as a
mode of ideological domination, conforming students to the demands of
dominant society; or whether citizenship education should be designed to
foster social reconstruction, by helping students (and others) to become
creative, critical thinkers and active social participants, and to become
capable of redefining the nature of their own lives in the society in which
they live. The author's bias must be evident there . Our task, then, is to
determine how it is that citizenship education functions either to reproduce
the social condition of labor and the mechanisms of social control that rein-
force a class-stratified society; or, alternatively, how citizenship education
can be designed to equip students to challenge and reconstitute society ac-
cording to the principles of social justice and equitable economic opportunity .
Modes of Rationality: The Theories of Henry Giroux
Henry Giroux, in his article "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizen-
ship Education," has drawn extensively from the Frankfurt School's notion
of rationality (Giroux, 1980) . Giroux has identified three specific modes of
rationality-the technical, the hermeneutic, and the emancipatory- and
had defined each in terms of its social attitudes and practices, as well as its
underlying assumptions . Together, the elements of each mode of rationality
serve to mediate how individuals or groups relate to the wider society.'
Giroux then evaluates each of these modes of rationality according to the
degree to which he believes it can illuminate for educators and students the
ways in which meanings and values are constructed and transmitted in
schools, and in whose interest these meanings and values serve . More
specifically, with regard to citizenship education, we can inquire, with
respect to each mode of rationality : whose knowledge is taught, whose in-
terest does it serve, and what might the relationship be between specific
forms of knowledge and the access that people have to certain modes of
power . Giroux believes that these questions measure the possibilities for
personal development, social critique, and social action in American society
that can be achieved via each of his three modes or rationality .
The first of Giroux's modes of rationality is "technical rationality," which
he describes as being based on the principles of prediction and control, and
which (he claims) employs a monological view of knowledge, and mistakenly
ascribes to all scientific study the so-called value-free validity of the natural
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sciences. Giroux claims that this mode of rationality underlies two forms of
citizenship education, the "transmission model" and the "social science
model."' This discussion cannot digress into in-depth analyses of these
models, but Giroux argues that both of them are characterized by a flawed
epistemology and by a passive view of human behavior, and that they ig-
nore the contradictions and conflicts that exist in the social order . Absent
from both of these models of citizenship education, Giroux claims, are the
"normative, historical political landscapes that give them meaning" .
"Hermeneutic rationality," Giroux's second mode, is interested "in un-
derstanding how the forms, categories and assumptions beneath the tex-
ture of everyday life contribute to our understanding of each other and the
world around us" (Giroux, 1980:341). The corresponding model of citizen-
ship education, the "reflective inquiry" approach, is based on the premise
that citizenship can best be taught by engaging students in decisionmaking
in the sociopolitical context, i .e ., by the "social construction" of classroom
knowledge. The situations and concerns that students study are their own :
the task for students is to examine their personal values, and to "define
problems within the context of their own experiences ." The reflective in-
quiry model is primarily concerned with the problem-solving, decision-
making process . Giroux believes that while this model is an advance over
the technocratic rationality models of citizenship education, it nonetheless
"tends to overlook how ideological or structural constraints in the larger
society are reproduced in schools so as to mediate against the possibility of
critical theory thinking and constructive dialogue" (Giroux, 1980 :343). This
is an important point . It is sometimes alleged that schools exist in a political-
social vacuum, but we must not forget that teachers and students carry
around with them various forms of ideologies, attitudes, and sedimented
history which extend far beyond the immediate classroom experience . It is
therefore possible, in the reflective inquiry model, that "the basic nature of
existing social arrangements in the wider society" may remain unquestioned
(Giroux, 1980 :343) .
Giroux's third mode of rationality, "emancipatory rationality," is based
on critique and action :
"This mode of rationality is construed as the capacity of critical thought
to reflect on and reconstruct its own historical genesis, i .e ., to think
about the process of thinking itself . . . . [it is] aimed at breaking
through the "frozen" ideology that prevents a critique of the life and
world on which rationalizations of the dominant society are based .
Similarly, emancipatory rationality augments its interest in self-
reflection with social action designed to create the ideological and
material conditions in which nonalienating and nonexploitative rela-
tionship can exist" (Giroux, 1980:347) .
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Models of Citizenship Education
Two models of citizenship education that fit into this mode of rationality
are characterized as the "political economist" and the "culturalist" positions
(Giroux, 1980) . The political economist position, epitomized by Bowles and
Gintis (1976), is useful in that it situates schools in the broader context of
political and social institutions, and dismisses the notion of the "innocence"
of schooling . The political economist model takes into account those forces
"that affect human behavior [but which] cannot be traced by referring solely
to the immediate context or consciousness of the human subject "(Giroux,
1980:348). The problem with this approach, according to Giroux, is that it
treats schools as "black boxes," and its advocates do not tell us how the
modes of reproduction and domination function on a day-to-day basis
within schools . This model also tends to adhere to a "leftist" version of
management ideology .
The second model of emancipatory citizenship education, the culturalist
position, has emerged within the last decade in England . This new sociology
of education, now relatively well known through the works of Young
(1976), Keddie (1976), and Sharp and Greene (1975), among others, focuses
on how the elements of "consciousness, ideology and power enter into the
way human beings constitute their day-to-day realities . . . . [C]ulturalists
have attempted, in part, to explain how human actions within the grip of
structures such as schools escape, resist, and transform the effects of the lat-
ter" (Giroux, 1980 :348) . According to Giroux, this model of citizenship
education offers the best potential for truly emancipatory pedagogy because
it begins with a recognition of the necessity of first examining the most basic
"assumptions concerning the aims of education-assumptions regarding
who is going to be educated, and assumptions about what kind of knowl-
edge, values, and social relationships are going to be deemed legitimate as
educational concerns" (Giroux, 1980 :349) .
The next step in the culturalist model, according to Giroux, is to look at
teachers and at what teachers do in classrooms : in essence to focus in on and
develop a new `teaching consciousness' . If teachers believe in or submit to a
rationality that is oppressive - be it racist, sexist, elitist, etc ., - the nature of
the citizenship education experience in particular, or the entire educational
experience in general, will not generate anything that is very different for
the students . Teachers would first have to reconceptualize the very notion
of schooling itself, by situating "their own beliefs, values and practices
within a wider context so that their latent meanings can be understood"
(Giroux, 1980:350) .
It seems that we educators are going to have to begin to help teachers
develop a fresh, dialectical mode of reasoning . Schooling is going to have to
be looked at within its context of social and political relationships ; and the
teacher's beliefs, ideologies, and ways of looking at the curriculum, as well
as the message systems implicit in the curriculum, in teaching methods, in
4
discipline, and in the standards and methods of student evaluation, must be
re-examined . To this end, an historical analysis of the origins of education
theory can help teachers come to grips with their own genesis . Through an
examination of this history, teachers can begin to examine such fundamen-
tal questions as, in whose interest do teachers actually or ideally serve, and
what kinds of social relationships do we support? We will need to develop a
clearer understanding of who are in the classrooms of today's society, and
to practice a more reflective attitude toward some of the basic, structural
issues of this society .
As a critical imperative for an emancipatory theory of citizenship educa-
tion, Giroux believes that the notion of culture will have to be politicized .
For too long we have "bought" the mainstream social science perspective,
which simplistically defines culture as a people's way of life. Giroux believes
this narrow, "value-free" definition limits discussion of societal notions
such as class, social conflict, power, and justice . Giroux believes culture
should be defined instead "in terms of its functional relationship to the
dominant social formations and power relations in a given society" (Giroux,
1980:352), because the dominant culture (and its values in actuality only
represents the ruling political, economic, and social interests . We need to
realize that the notion of culture as currently transmitted in schools is
mediated by the dominant society ; and that the dominant culture in turn
mediates between itself and secondary or minority cultures . The dominant
culture in this way is capable of imposing on cultural minorities the stereo-
typical or oppressive self-images that hinder their own progress and
development . Without emancipatory restructuring, our schools - as cultural
institutions inextricably involved in the production and definition ,of mean-
ing-will continue to support, sustain, and reproduce only the dominant
culture and its inequitable power relationships, and to alienate rather than
enfranchise minority youth .
Giroux calls for the "politicalization of culture" in order to raise teacher
consciousness and re-evaluate both school knowledge and student cultural
capital . This consciousness-raising will, first of all, stimulate the passions,
intellects, and imaginations of both students and teachers ; and it can also
begin to move them towards action for constructive social change .
Emancipatory Pedagogy
Giroux has outlined a number of ideas for a new, emancipatory
classroom pedagogy . In essence, students must be taught civic courage and
encouraged to critique the existing society "against its own claims" about its
own values and what it claims to have achieved . Students should also be en-
couraged to reconceptualize, dream, and envision different societal ar-
rangements and possibilities. Heightened social consciousness, and a cre-
atively restructured mode of student and teacher participation seem to offer
real possibility for human emancipation, as students and teachers explore
the contradictions and the struggles that occur within the daily lives .
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George Wood, on the other hand, has pointed out some of the difficulties
which might be involved in the application of Giroux's ideas (Wood, 1982) .
Placing Giroux's work within the genre of `resistance theory' Wood was ini-
tially apprehensive about its transferability. Perhaps this apprehensions
springs from a lack of pragmatic pedagogical formulae in this particular ar-
ticle by Giroux . Giroux advocates active student participation in the learn-
ing process ; he prescribes teaching students how to think critically and how
to compare different world views ; he prescribes providing students with the
opportunity to speak in their own voices to authenticate their own ex-
periences; and he would have teachers assure that classroom pedagogy will
draw upon the cultural capital that students bring with them to the learning
situation. But Wood is concerned to know what this pedagogy might actually
look like in classrooms on a daily basis . In other words, teachers need a "for
instance" .
In reponse to Wood's call, I recommend that teachers, especially at the
preservice level, start with some very readable descriptions of such eman-
cipatory pedagogy, e.g ., Warner's work with Maori children in New
Zealand (1964); Searle's work with poor working class children in England
(1975); Freire's work with Brazilian peasants (1973) ; and Brown's work
with minority and poor children in Oakland, California (1978) . All of
these master teachers incorporated the authentic language, the generative
words, or the organic vocabulary and originals writings of their students .
The pedagogy employed also seems to be historically situated in the real life-
world conditions of the students and to use these conditions as guides to
classroom praxis .
What I believe to be critical to effective emancipatory citizenship educa-
tion is the linkage of practical experiences generated from the "life-world"
of a community culture -those experiences that its scholars have identified
as part of the cultural knowledge base of a particular community-to
classroom experience . Such cultural knowledge, which pervades the history
and present-day reality of a community, is what scholars distill and for-
mulate as the philosophy and social theory of their constituency .
The Case of African-American Cultural Knowledge
Philosopher Lucius Outlaw (1983) argues that in order for leaders (e .g .,
teachers, as Fontaine will tell us) to assist African-Americans in their efforts
to emancipate themselves from their subordinate position in American so-
ciety, and in order to be a guiding influence in their struggle against cul-
tural imperialism, domination, and ideological hegemony, must make sure
that praxis is grounded "in the concrete needs and aspirations of African-
Americans" (Outlaw, 1983 :66) . Outlaw also believes that the cultural modes
of rationality which hold the most promise for emancipation will be found
in the "life-world" of African-Americans, and along with Harold Cruse
(1967) he explicitly rejects the notions of the American melting pot and
6
assimilation through the ideal of integration . Instead, he contends that truly
emancipatory life-world orientations for African-Americans can be found
by looking inward :
" . . . in the mediated folk tales ; in religious practices; in political
language and practices prevalent during various times, under various
conditions; in forms of music, poetry, language of common currency,
etc. As these forms of expression, in their concretness as life-praxis, are
constitutive elements of the life-world of African-American people,
then the meanings they hold, in symbolic and/or explicit form, contain
fundamental orientations . Reclaiming them through acts of reflection
will provide understandings of the historically conditioned concerns of
black people (Outlaw, 1983 :66) .
African-American cultural knowledge itself can be uniquely emancipatory
for African-Americans-because it is born out of the African-American
community's historic common struggle and resistance against the various
oppressive effects of capitalism and racism which have kept them in a sub-
ordinate position in American society . In fact, a number of specific, in-
digenous emancipatory currents of thought have pervaded African-
American philosophical, sociological and educational scholarship over the
past century and more : self-help, service, nationalism, economic autonomy,
and political power (Gordon, 1983) . These indigenous themes or currents of
thought have generative meaning for the African-American community
from which they came . After a brief examination of the genesis of these cur-
rents of thought, I will explain their potential emancipatory power in
classroom pedagogy. In this effort, I believe I am working toward what
Giroux (1980) envisions as emancipatory citizenship education .
Educational Science and Ethnocentrism in American Education . The ap-
plication of "educational science" to curriculum development in the early
part of this century seems to have played an unfortunate role in the
perpetuation of the cognitive inferiority theory and its consequential
second-class subordinate status for African-Americans . Furthermore, at the
same time that educational science was employed as a means of differen-
tiating cognitive ability in children, the psychological and scientific prin-
ciples of business management were introduced into the public schools as
administrative conveniences for handling the influx of children of im-
migrant and former slaves into the cities . Edward L. Throndike's educa-
tional psychological theories in particular, most notably his principles of in-
telligence testing, provided a rationale for Snedden the social engineer, and
the curricularists Bobbit and Charters . Their paradigms of social efficiency
and the "differentiated" curriculum legitimatized the distribution of dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge among certain ascribed categories of children, to
prepare them to assume different roles and functions in adult society (Gor-
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don, 1982) . Unfortunately for African-Americans, their position within this
ethnocentric hierarchical framework was considered to be inferior to
whites, and this belief was repeatedly "verified" by the empirical "scientific"
research which became a legitimated part of the quoted literature (Gordon,
1980) .
It is of signal importance that while there is a voluminous literature writ-
ten about education for African-Americans in the first decades of this cen-
tury, the extensive literature written by African-American scholars and
educators on this subject is neither represented nor referenced in the domi-
nant educational literature . We cannot any longer afford to overlook the
important corpus of endogenous knowledge generated and implemented by
African-American scholars that speaks to educational philosophy, theory,
and pedagogy . Moreover, as pointed out by Berry and Blassingame (1982),
Franklin and Anderson (1978) and Gordon (1983), a new body of literature
that provides a new perspective on black educational history from 1896 to
the present has also begun to emerge . This substantial body of knowledge
generated by modern black scholars has also been largely overlooked by the
dominant historical texts - a point that is painfully obvious when studying,
for example, Fitzpatrick (1936), Woefel (1933), or Mulhern (1948) . 3
I do not believe there is a conspiracy to underdevelop African-Americans,
or to deny them to advancing knowledge, or to negate or ignore their
scholarship ; the effects of ethnocentrism and racist attitudes that permate
American (and Western) society are much more fundamental than to with-
stand such simplification . As I have argued elsewhere, the subtle currents of
the ethnocentrism and racism which inhere in the Anglo-Saxon world-view
pervade the dominant culture in American society at every level (Gordon,
1983) .
African-American scholars have illuminated and analyzed from an
African-American perspective the internal structure of the black community,
the effects on African-Americans within their subordinate position in the
larger society, and various forms of resistance which African-Americans
have developed in order to survive - and advance - in the capitalist and
racist society in which they find themselves . It is this kind of self-knowledge
that emancipates people . African-Americans must learn their own seldom-
explored history, because their own history makes the dominant society's
"commonsense" interpretive knowledge problematic . Exploring their own
history also provides the opportunity for African-Americans to critique the
dominant culture's world view, and to formulate their own cultural and
epistemological statements . Furthermore, we can trace in the evolution of
black scholarship the evolution of a uniquely African-American cultural
mode of rationality . 4
The Legacy of African-American Cultural Knowledge and Black Educa-
tional Philosophy . During the period from 1890 to 1920, the United States
experienced thorough going change in all aspects of its economic, political,
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and industrial structure, as the country was transformed from a mercantile
to an industrial society . The earliest African-American scholars, William
E. B. DuBois, Kelly Miller and Booker Taliaferro Washington (among
others) experienced this industrial and social change and generated historical
perspectives on the place of African-Americans in the newly developing in-
dustrial era.
Much has been written elsewhere concerning the Washington/DuBois
controversy . Although DuBois clashed with Washington, over the most ef-
fective means of uplifting .and developing the black race, they shared the
same goals : economic autonomy for political power self-reliance, and com-
munity service . Both Washington and DuBois also envisioned a cultural
knowledge base, upon which subsequent political, economic, philosophical
thought would be developed . While Washington argued for an agricultural
scientific basis, to serve the masses of African-Americans still in the South
in the 1890s and early 1900s, DuBois argued that emphasis had to be given
to the best and the brightest, and that their education should be more
classical, theoretical, and conceptual . The debate over these conflicting
educational paradigms-the intellectual and the practical -within the
African-American community may itself have served to further the develop-
ment of a black intelligentsia .
Washington and DuBois each played a significant role in the production
and dissemination of knowledge. As theorists, they developed paradigms
and conceptual frameworks, and organized institutions into knowledge-
producing systems to clarify and explain the condition of African-
Americans in American society . Then, as pragmatists, they applied their
knowledge to the challenges of building an industrial base and achieving
economic autonomy .'
Kelly Miller of Howard University, writing in 1908, reflects a theme that
is characteristic of much of the early twentieth-century black scholarship :
the nationalist view. Miller was concerned about the progress and the
development of African-Americans, and argued that they should strive
primarily for economic independence and self-reliance . Along with DuBois,
he rejected the social darwinist theories which dominated English and
American sociological thought . While he squarely blamed white racism for
attempting to thwart black progress, he also addressed the problems which
he felt existed within the African-American community itself .
Miller reasoned, first, that the "Negro's Part in - the Negro Problem" was
the schism between the educated African-Americans and the African-
American masses . Miller argued that when the black bourgeoisie accepted
white intellectual and educational paradigms, they came to hate themselves
and the masses as well . This theory foreshadows what Carter G . Woodson
would say twenty-five years later . Miller (and later Woodson) also recognized
the necessity of both a theoretical approach (DuBois) and a practical ap-
proach (Washington) to education in the struggle to advance the black race .
Miller argued that African-Americans should receive training in both the in-
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tellectual, classical field (which he called "higher education"), and in
manual skills and agricultural and industrial science, since each served an
essential role in the overall effort for advancement and progress (Miller,
1908 :267) . Echoing DuBois, he wrote, "A most significant indication of
progress is the emergence of a superior class . The talented tenth constitutes
the controlling factor in the life of any people ." (Miller, 1908 :105) Yet he
also realized the potentially symbiotic relationship between higher educa-
tion and industrial activities (Miller, 1908 :267) . 6
Early black thought, especially with regard to the role of education in
uplifting and the development of African-American people as a group, was
very nationalistic in its beliefs . Early black scholars believe that the need for
African-Americans to take charge of every aspect of Afro-American life
and culture was axiomatic . In these early writings (1890s to early 1920s,
black scholars sought a collective self-knowledge and critical understanding
which could form the basis for a cultural mode of rationality . The pervasive
themes in these early writings were an ideology of emancipation (freedom
from domination) ; self-help ; self-reliance ; economic autonomy (in-
dependence) ; and political power .
These early nationalist themes were soon seriously challenged, however,
by an alternative exogenous influences on black scholarship . A new crop of
young African-American scholars, from the mid 1920s to 1930s was trained
in social science paradigms that supported instead the dominant culture's in-
terpretations of the African-American condition; and these paradigms
haunted black scholarship and hindered black progress throughout most of
the next sixty years .
In the ten years between 1926 and 1936, more black students graduated
from college than in the entire previous century (Fontaine, 1940) . Where
these students were educated, and the paradigms they were grounded in, is
critical in understanding the deviation of the new black social theory from
the traditional (a more natural) nationalist perspective .
These young African-Americans were schooled in a new alien model
grounded on ecological assimilationist/integrationist perspectives . Else-
where I have examined the profound influence of the Chicago school of
sociology on black scholarship (Gordon, 1983) . The sociological theories of
Robert Parks and Ernest Burgess, which are grounded in social Darwinist
theory, shifted the second generation of young black scholars from the very
independent endogenous black paradigms of nationalism, economic auton-
omy, political power, self-help, and self-reliance, and service to a depen-
dency ideology grounded in a culturally `alien' technocratic rationality
paradigm .
The influence of the Chicago school has also recently been discussed by
other black scholars (e .g ., Ellison, 1973 ; Ibn Alkalimat, 1973 ; Jones, 1973 ;
Bowser, 1981). The main conclusion of these scholars is that the Chicago
school paradigms profoundly altered the ways in which the condition and
10
the plight of African-Americans were perceived -by African-Americans as
well as by whites . Black scholars trained in this school then proceeded to
collect "accurate" socioeconomic data on the black urban community; but
their theory-bound conclusions and non-emancipatory policy recommenda-
tions could go no further than the ethnocentric phenomenological con-
structs they employed and the particularly inappropriate investigative frame-
work within which they worked (Bowser, 1981) .
How African-Americans were to be educated and for what purpose con-
tinued to be a central concern of black scholarship during the late 1920s and
the 1930s, however, Carter G . Woodson and William T . Fontaine examined
this issue and formulated a methodology and an ideology which revitalized
the traditional black concept of black nationalism and economic and
political independence, which African-Americans trained in the influential
Chicago school had rejected .
A Critique of the New Negro : Carter G. Woodson and William T . Fontaine
on the Education and Mis-Education of African-Americans . The decade
between 1926 and 1936 produced a record number of black college graduates .
They attended colleges such as Yale and Harvard as well as Fisk, Howard,
and many other schools across the country, both in the South and in the
North. Somewhat ironically, at the height of this outstanding effort and
achievement in higher education, Carter G . Woodson presented a thesis
that criticized the education that African-Americans were receiving and set
forth an alternative philosophical and ideological roadmap for the develop-
ment of African-Americans .
In The Mis-Education of the Negro, (1933), Woodson argued that the
education African-Americans were receiving was having a debilitating, crip-
pling effect on African-American youth, and that it was inhibiting their
social development and hindering their economic advancement . Woodson's
thesis was that African-Americans were, in effect, being miseducated, since
the `knowledge' they taught also systematically taught them self-hatred and
a self-image of inferiority. In this important critique of the status of black
education in America, Woodson explained how the predominant ecological
paradigms in which African-Americans were being educated and the
assumptions underlying these paradigms, by their very nature, served to
legitimate white racism and to rationalize the colonial or subordinate status
of African-Americans in American society. Woodson saw how difficult it
was for African-Americans to break away from these theories, which had
taken on the aura of the conventional wisdom and were presented as com-
monsense knowledge, because few students were ever encouraged to ques-
tion or challenge the assumptions that shaped these theories of social reality .
After all, "[w]hen you control a man's thinking, you do,not have to worry
about his actions . . . . He will find his proper place and will stay in it"
(Woodson, 1933 :xiii) .
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Woodson's primary criticism was that African-American students were
being taught as unquestioned objective reality only unfounded and
ethnocentric theories which supported the notion of black inferiority. He
argued that the academic training African-American students received and
the university level was discouraging them from attempting to play an ac-
tive, constructive role in the development of the race (Woodson, 1933) .
Woodson believed that the ethnocentric paradigms they studied caused
these young "educated" African-Americans to acquiesce in the notion that
African-Americans were inferior, and made them contemptuous both of
themselves and of the masses . Woodson theorized that when educated
African-Americans then tried to rationalize this self-hatred, their self-
limiting paradigms produced only self-defeating rationalizations of why the
masses of African-American people in America were not capable of
building an independent economic power base. The ironic consequence of
this miseducation, then, was that instead of empowering the African-
American intelligentsia to join with the masses in a collective effort to ad-
vance the race, the "education" of the young African-American intelligen-
tsia, the theorists, and the scientists, had instead served only to alienate
them from the masses . Woodson consequently believed that it was African-
American businessman, not the miseducated African-American intelligen-
tsia, who could be most helpful and influential in the advancement and
development of African-Americans .
For Woodson, as for many earlier writers, the most important obligation
incumbent upon any individual African-American was to serve the race in
its development . He insisted that African-Americans had to gain control
over their own institutions and he urged African-Americans to follow the
example-if not the teachings! -of Booker T . Washington, who was the
only African-American man who had ever actually built and controlled an
institution of higher learning (Woodson, 1933 :57) .
Woodson also believed that in white schools African-Americans did not
receive adequate preparation in either industrial or classical education . In
the former, African-Americans did not receive sufficient practice or oppor-
tunity, and upon graduation were barred from trade unions . In classical
education, African-Americans did not fare much better, he reasoned,
because it was evident that such training had failed to produce any sizeable
cadre of outstanding thinkers and philosophers : "They have not risen to
heights of black men farther removed from influences of slavery and
segregation" (Woodson, 1933 :15) .
In the matter of curriculum, the kinds of study that should be done,
Woodson advocated that it be both practical and applicable to the real
world situation. Woodson thus transcends the Booker T . Washington/
W.E .B . DuBois controversy by calling for a collaborative dialectic between
theorists and pragmatists .
Woodson believed in African-American "self reliance" to uplift the race .
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He argued that African-Americans must serve each other and must pull
together as a community, forgoing individual strife and conflict . He
thought community and interpersonal cooperation were essential if the con-
dition of African-Americans were to be improved; and he even advocated
several forms of collective enterprises (Woodson, 1933) .
The Legacy of an African-American Cultural Rationality . Collectively,
Woodson's efforts and those of his predecessors form component parts of a
broader endogenous African-American cultural mode of rationality,
wrought out of the reality and history of the African-American experience
in America. Woodson spoke about African-American history and about the
necessity of viewing oneself from an historical perspective, situated within
the racist and capitalist structure of American society . Woodson's thinking
reawakens our sensibilities to our own social experience, and to our own
history and aesthetics and values. Here, especially, the oral tradition in
African-American culture comes to mind, as well as the emphasis on physical
prowess. The philosophy Woodson promoted was also centered around the
tradition of service and the development of the Afro-American commu-
nity.' He tried to awaken African-Americans to the realization that imitat-
ing whites was an admission of self-hatred and rejection .
From this theoretical perspective on the nature and importance of
culture, Woodson also provides us with an understanding of how studying
their own culture, can help a people to determine, at any given point in
time, the kind of knowledge they need to pursue . Furthermore, Woodson,
by effectively politicizing culture, adds further cogency to Giroux's argu-
ment that cultural history is essential for an emancipatory pedagogy . Study-
ing the African-American cultural heritage thus not only teaches the truth
about those who oppress, and demystifies domination and colonial rule,
cultural self-knowledge is also self-instructive in that it can point out
weaknesses and illuminate ways in which the community as a whole can im-
prove and advance . 8
In his "new program," Woodson's reconceptualization of higher educa-
tion as a mechanism of service is nationalistic and seems to carry overtones
of "Booker T-ism ." His call for "radical reconstruction" of the analytical
framework and paradigms used to view the black experience in America,
however, is as current as Giroux's call for an emancipatory rationality . It
should be noted here that Woodson was anti-Marxist . Not that he was
against Marxism, but he viewed the Marxist influence as an alien force at-
tempting to invade the African-American community- another Euro-
American ethnocentric tradition-and believed it was not germaine to the
situation of African-Americans in America . Woodson believed that an en-
dogenous radicalism would have to emerge from within the African-
American community if it were to succeed . On the other hand, Woodson
also believed that African-Americans should not depend on or wait for
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liberal white support ; Woodson believed fervently that African-Americans
should do for themselves .
Woodson's notion of developing a new pedagogy to teach people about
themselves and their neighbors and heroes, and his ideal of the "real
teacher," precedes Freire's notions of education for critical consciousness
by thirty years ; and so does the research methodology he suggests as prelim-
inary step in establishing a curriculum for African-Americans (Woodson,
1933:151) . Woodson recognized the critical necessity of formulating our
indigenous philosophy, and of generating endogenously our own social
theory and ideology, so that African-American people would be able truly
to think for themselves and act in their community's own true interest . But
perhaps the most important of Woodson's contributions was his realization
of how social science paradigms and the underlying assumptions both shape
our perceptious of reality and influence social policy, and his insistence that
African-Americans must critique these taken-for-granted paradigms, chal-
lenge their validity, and generate their own .
Seven years after Woodson's critique of black education William Fon-
taine challenged the naive and uncritical way in which African-Americans
envisioned democracy as the heavenly antithesis to their servile state, and
expected that democracy alone would somehow automatically bring them
equity and freedom (Fontaine, 1940) . Fontaine believed that democracy was
hollow and ineffective from the standpoint of the aspirations and ambitions
of African-Americans . He questioned how a democracy which was "power-
less to prevent simultaneous existence of poverty and wealth, intelligence
and ignorance, dead-end kids and prep school Buster Brown" could possibly
bring equity and equality to descendants of slaves, who were confined to a
low-caste status in American society. Fontaine argued that African-American
scholars must reject the "democratic liberal science Weltanschauung" and
adopt a "defensive psychology" posture, generated from the black perspec-
tive on the African-American experience . The "knowledge" generated
within this defense psychology was "socially determined," as a response to
the ascribed low-caste status of African-Americans ; i .e ., "there is a correla-
tion between the knowledge propounded by Negro scholars and the social
situation confronting the Negro group" (Fontaine, 1944 in Harris, ed .,
1983:105) .
For example, African-American scholars such as Carter G. Woodson un-
masked the "sins of omission and commission in writers like Hegel, Dunning,
J . W. Burgess, J . F. Rhodes, A. D. White, etc." (Fontaine, 1940) . These
scholars (and also Charles Wesley) made invaluable methodological contri-
butions in historiography by demonstrating the importance of subjectivity
and point of view :
"Dr. Wesley not only contends that `history is an expanding concept
embracing the ways in which ALL people have lived throughout the
ages,' but in addition to the inclusion of facts about the Negro he
14
believes that the Negro's perspective should be used in the interpreta-
tion of these facts" (Fontaine, 1940:8-9) .
Reminiscent of Woodson's call for a "new" educational program to
counter the mis-education of African-American people, Fontaine believed
that the philosophy of African-American teachers would have to embrace
would be one of counter-indocrination . Fontaine described this as a
"toughminded" approach, a kind of provocative revolutionary thought in-
volving black opposition to the "democratic-liberal scientific Weltan-
schauung" in all areas of African-American scholarship, from history and
sociology to literature. In essence then, Fontaine saw counter-indoctrination
as a psychologically healthy, nationalistic stance .
Emancipatory Trends in Present-Day African-American Scholarship .
Research and writings in black educational history and thought continued
to provide much material on the topics of integration, desegregation,
boycotts, and liberalism, and responses to these issues from both the
African-American and white communities, etc ., (Cox, 1948; Herbst, 1973) .
However a major shortcoming of the African-American intelligentsia which
has persisted up until the present time has been their failure to take the work
put forth by such scholars as Booker T . Washington, W . E. B . DuBois,
Kelly Miller, Carter G . Woodson, and William T . Fontaine to synthesize it
into a body of knowledge and to makelt the basis of a common intellectual
heritage that would give leadership and direction to the African-American
community. The failure of African-American intellectuals to gain control
over educational and other institutions, mass media, publishing houses .
dominant societal national organizations, etc., also means that they have
been excluded from influential participation in the political, theoretical,
and ideological debates in the mainstream society. But even more critical
for the advancement of African-American people, is that the failure of the
African-American intelligentsia to formulate its own knowledge base has
meant that African-Americans are still being schooled in the same (old)
ideological hegemonic paradigms that still served to legitimate and
reproduce the dominant culture .
The problem of the hegemonic impact of Euro-American theory, be it
conservative or even radical theory, on black cultural and political thought
has also long been recognized . It was raised as early as 1913 by Arthur
Schomburg, and has recently been examined by such African-American
scholars as Manning Marable (1981), John Brown Childs (1981) and James
M. Jones (1979) . Other theorists are also beginning to articulate the dif-
ferences between the American and European social, cultural, and political
contexts, and the reflections of these differences in the respective schools of
neo-Marxist thought (Aronowitz, 1981) .
Contemporary African-American scholars realize, for example, that
socialism alone will not insure the abolition of racism. According to
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Marable (1981), "there is not . . . a body of knowledge which could be
described as a Marxian theory of racism which can be directly applied to our
understanding of American society ."
There is thus a growing consensus among African-American scholars that
what they must now do is return to their own traditions, history, and
cultural thought, and begin to articulate their own cultural mode of ra-
tionality, independent of Western European domination . There has also
been a significant resurgence of interest in the African-American concept of
culture. Raymond Williams, for example, views culture as "a record of a
number of important and continuing reactions to changes in our social,
economic and political life" (Childs, 1981 :43) . Also along this line, John
Brown Childs, in his study of DuBois conception of culture within the
African-American community, has defined culture as "a historically
grounded way of existence" (Childs, 1981) . We can thus observe, within
contemporary African-American literature, an emerging awareness of the
existence of a distinct cultural mode of rationality, although at the present
time there is little formal writing on the topic in the educational literature .
Awareness of such a mode of rationality has increased as a result of the per-
sistent efforts of African-American scholars to conceptualize alternative
scientific and philosophical paradigms for the purpose of systematically
analyzing African-American culture (Berry and Blassingame, 1982 ; Boykin,
1979; Childs, 1981 ; Franklin and Anderson, 1981 ; Gordon, 1982 ; Jones,
1979; Ladner (ed.), 1973 ; Marable, 1981) .
While all of these scholars, and many others, are grappling with issues
and concerns within their respective disciplines, there is still a need for a
synthesis of this body of knowledge into what I believe will form an
African-American epistemology . One way of getting a handle on this
massive amount of knowledge would be to continue to look for eman-
cipatory categories or currents of thought (such as those referred to in this
paper: self-help ; service; nationalism ; political power, economic autonomy)
generated from the daily experiences of the African-American people, and
use these in systematic study . With continued research, the categories may,
under scientific scrutiny, collapse, be subsumed into another category, or be
refined or expanded. One would suspect that the categories will change
shape and form during the dynamic process of generating theory hued from
black consciousness . But this process is the first step toward true cultural
emancipation and self-realization for African-Americans .
Implementing Emancipatory Pedagogy For Children
(and Teachers) : Challenges and Implications
Emancipatory pedagogy requires the reconceptualization of knowledge
into new forms of ideology, paradigms, and assumptions that can help il-
luminate and clarify African-American reality . Emancipatory pedagogy
also requires counter-indoctrination against the blind acceptance of the
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dominant culture's concepts and paradigms . Emancipatory pedagogy is the
freeing of one's mind to explore the essence and influence of the African-
American race throughout the world, and the ability to pass on that infor-
mation to the next generation as a foundation upon which to build . This in-
formation can generate emancipatory perspectives : for example, black
Egyptian civilization lasted a thousand years, while the United States is little
more than two hundred years old . When a child ponders this historical fact
s/he develops a different perspective on Africa and her rulers . In essence ; it
triggers a "gestalt switch" that enables one "to see" something s/he had not
seen before, but which was there all along .
In teacher education courses, this type of critical awareness can also be
taught . For example, in teaching social studies, student teachers (and the
children they teach) can be taught to critically examine the descriptive
language and the knowledge in elementary school history books that is
presented as objective fact, true and unbiased (see Cynthia Brown (1978),
for example) . Student teachers might critically examine how history is
disseminated in various ways : take, for example, a pamphlet Highlights Of
Ohio History, published by The Bell Telephone Company for Ohio elemen-
tary school children :
"LaSalle Discovers the Ohio River . In 1669, the famous French ex-
plorer LaSalle wrote his name in Ohio History by his discovery of the
Ohio River . . . . Told about the river by the missionaries, he was
warned of the fierce Iroquois who guarded it . . ." (Ohio Bell Telephone
Co., 1953 :5) .
Words such as `discover', `fierce', and `missionaries' become problematic
and under examination take on very interesting, self-serving properties .
In the next example, from the same booklet, we can analyze the
knowledge disseminated about Ohio's Native American population :
"The Indians in Ohio. Ohio pioneers not only had to conquer a vast
wilderness; they had to come to terms with the many Indian tribes that
inhabited the territory . Many of these Indian chiefs and their tribes
have left their mark on the pages of Ohio's history . Among them are . . .
Chief Tecumseh . . . Many others, such as the Delawares . . . gave up
their struggles against the settlers in the Greenville treaty . In 1842, the
Wyandot tribe was the last tribe to leave the Ohio Country and open the
entire territory for peaceful settlement" (Ohio Bell Telephone Co .,
1953 :6) .
By studying the meaning and contextual usage of words such as "conquer,"
"hostile," "struggles," "treaty," and "peaceful settlement" in this section,
and the assumption behind them, student-teachers and children (in both in-
termediate and upper elementary grades, as demonstrated in Brown [1973]),
begin to discern what is and is not being taught . They also realize that
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"facts" and values are interrelated, and that if the paradigms and assump-
tions are already determined, the intended interpretations will have also
been decided. This kind of critical analysis through the reconceptualization
of knowledge enable teachers and students, to fairly consider the righteous
indignation on the part of the Native American nations, and to detect and
unpack colonialism and racism in such reading materials . Moreover, this
kind of critical analysis allows both students and teachers to study in a more
open and broad fashion such issues of genocide and the history of the
displacement of indigenous peoples, as well as war and refugees in the world
today .
Paradigm to Praxis .
Pedagogy, of course, must be susceptible of understanding and imple-
mentation . In the spirit of Woodson, I propose some interpretations and
suggestions for applying theory to praxis in promoting an emancipatory
rationality .
Returning to the African-American categories of self-help, economic
autonomy, political power, nationalism, and service, I postulate that
citizenship education for African-American children, in fact for all
children, must shift away from models based on rationalizations of colo-
nialism, and emphasize instead the emancipation of the mind and spirit .
Instead of teaching children with negative imagery, we must allow students
to speak with their own authentic voices (cf . Warner), and then engage them
in formal classroom work which uses their own cultural capital as a bridge
between their own life-world and classroom experience . In such an effort to
teach "from the bottom up," using the cultural capital of the children, it
may be appropriate to use reading material like DuBois' Dusk Qf Dawn
(1940) and The Dark Princess: A Romance (1928), or the autobiographies
of Woodson, Malcolm X, and one of the 1984 presidential candidates, the
Reverend Jessie Jackson . While such material would be a challenge (and
perhaps even a struggle), it is through conflict and struggle that students
grow and learn. Moreover, this would introduce them to a body of classical
literature heretofore generally omitted from the public school curriculum .
Many African-American people, however, have not fully enjoyed reading
because the acquisition of those skills has been mystified, and made, I
believe, unnecessarily difficult and at times painful for minority and poor
folk. My second practical suggestion would therefore be to ask each
member of the Afro-American intellectual community to promote the
reading of (and buy or somehow supply copies of) the works mentioned in
this article to public, school and/or church libraries so that the community
has access to them to be read and discussed . The beauty of these books,
especially Woodson's book, is that it is very readable, would promote dis-
cussion and would hopefully encourage further reading . To actualize such
an idea within our communities would, no doubt, be a challenge, but the
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longest journey begins with one step. This suggestion also follows our tradi-
tional categories of self-help and service, so that the means is as culturally
valid as its intended end .
My final suggestion centers around the concept of nationalism . It
behooves African-American scholars to generate a list of basic readings for
the academicians as well as the lay population . We can start the list with the
pivotal works of Woodson, W. E. B. DuBois, and Booker T. Washington .
Woodson described the best teacher as one who taught people using their
own heroes and telling them about themselves ; and if we let these key
figures "speak for themselves," their works will come to serve as common
intellectual touchstones for all African-Americans, and as reference points
in our new emancipatory paradigms .
Conclusion
This discussion is not merely another effort to rationalize the teaching of
African-American history in schools . My first thesis is that we as teacher-
educators and teachers can learn how better to educate African-Americans
by studying black scholarship ; my second thesis is that exploring the African-
American experience in classroom learning situations, coupled with an
emancipatory paradigm, can be a liberating experience for all our children .
I am not just advocating some African-American equivalent of (or alter-
native to) the indoctrination of dominant American patriotism (what the
dominant culture calls teaching American history) . My goal was to share my
understanding of the emancipatory process, and how teachers can imple-
ment a methodology to educate minority children to become creatively
thinking and effectively active citizens in this society (even though it is not
at all clear to me that the dominant culture in this society wants a critically
thinking and active citizenry) .
It is my contention that one methodology which recommends itself is
to begin by understanding the tradition of resistance among African-
Americans, and to use the emancipatory modes of rationality that were
born from their struggle as a basis for pedagogy . Citizenship education then
ideally becomes education for informed political awareness, and in the
practice of critically analyzing reality, and not simply a process of rote in-
doctrination . By attempting to illuminate the genesis of some of the in-
digenous African-American currents of thought, I have tried to provide a
better understanding of the nature of emancipatory rationality and its ap-
propriateness as a basis for preparing citizens to participate in building a
socially just and economically humane society .
This discussion has come full circle: I began by talking about how a soci-
ety reproduces itself, and have ended by proposing one means by which we
can-I hope-challenge ideological hegemony through critical reflection
and responsible, active communal participation, and regenerate our society
along lines more in keeping with its own professed ideals .
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Endnotes
1 . These are ideal essence constructs . Clearly there are modes of citizenship education that
combine into and exist in that grey area . For the point of making a link between a specific
mode of citizenship education and the rationality and ideology that defines it, the ideal con-
structs are worthwhile .
2 . Barr, Barth and Shermis (1977) explain citizenship transmission as follows : citizenship is
best promoted by inculcating the "right" values as a framework for making decisions . Par-
ticular concepts should be learned and believed . Teachers make assumptions about what is
desirable behavior, what social culture rewards and punishes, and what is the best form of
social participation . The teacher knows the requirements of a good citizen and attempts to
transmit that concept of reality . Essentially, it is the desire to transmit a conception of the ideal
society and the ideal citizen . The teacher transmits the selected concepts and values by such
techniques as description and persuasion through the use of textbooks, recitation, lectures,
question and answer sessions, and structured problem-solving exercises . The content is,
selected by an authority, interpreted by the teacher, and has the function of illustrating values,
beliefs, and attitudes. Content begins with "oughts and "givens" -knowledge and beliefs that
are given as self-evident; these could be either items of knowledge or behavior guidelines .
Woven into the fabric of the curriculum, whether on the playground or in classroom is the
assumption that there are appropriate procedures and rules . These authors also describe and
defend social studies taught as social science as follows : citizenship is best promoted by
decision-making, based on the mastery of social science concepts, processes, and problems .
This tradition assumes that when students acquire the knowledge, skills, and devices of a par-
ticular discipline, they become effective citizens . Therefore, the acquisition of the knowledge-
gathering skills of social scientists results in the ultimate goals of enhanced citizenship. Each of
the social sciences has its own method of gathering and verifying knowledge . Students should
discover and apply the method that is appropriate to each social science .
3. Merle Curti (1935) is an exception in this case, because he did, in fact, cite the work of
Booker T. Washington in his research .
4. Elsewhere I have discussed in detail the interpretive history of African-American
knowledge paradigms and influences in the education of Black people (Gordon, 1983) . As I
heard myself writing these words "African-Americans must learn their own history", first a
great pain welled up within me and then the dawning awareness of the reason for that pain . I
thought such questions had already been raised in the 1960's, and did not realize that this great
awareness period waned, that the African-American children today seem to possess less
cultural and historical knowledge of their people than I had as an adolescent and throughout
my teens . (It should also be noted that during my high school years, I listened to John Col-
trane, Bobby Timmons and Thelonious Monk while my contemporary counterparts are listen-
ing to Michael Jackson and Prince .) I thought such battles has been won, and never really
thought about them again, which is probably the most elegant statement as to why we are still
fighting the same battles .
5 . One interesting aside is that in African philosophical thought, Cesaire (1972) and Mbiti
(1970) both talk about the relationship between theory and practice : African philosophy and
culture is a continued merging of theory and praxis .
6 . It should also be pointed out that Miller stated that what was needed to help the race was
"not mere theorizers" but practical application . The relationship between atheory and practice
(praxis) is another characteristic/current of thought that reappears through black scholarship
and will be discussed later . Suffice it to say that Miller's belief that dynamic knowledge "which
clarifies the vision, refines the feelings, broadens the conception of truth and duty . . . is of the
highest and most valuable form of practicability," could be traced to African philosophy,
where philosophy is in concert with action (Miller, 1908 :272 ; Mbiti, 1969) .
7. One interesting side of Woodson in the book is his style . It is simple and straightforward .
In a way, it is a demonstration of practicing his own philosophy. Although he was apparently
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critized for this practical, simplified style, this style makes the information more accessible to
the larger, less scholarly audience .
8 . Within this teaching of culture, Woodson even takes religion to task : "If Negro got their
conception of religion from slaveholders, libertines, and murderers, there may be something
wrong about it, and it would not hurt to investigate it . It has been said that the Negroes do not
connect morals with religion . The historian would like to know what race or nation does such a
thing . Certainly the whites with whom the Negroes have come into contact have not done so"
(Woodson, 1933 :73).
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Introduction
Far too often students complain that social studies is one of their most
uninteresting and dreary subjects. It is, for them, l'enfant terrible of their
school day . For most of us, this is not news . Yet, it is disconcerting every
time we are reminded of this unfortunate state of affairs because of a visit
to a school, a conversation with a teacher, or the release of studies reporting
on the unhappy state of social studies, such as those of Farman, Natriello,
& Dornbusch (1978) ; Fernandez, Massey, & Dornbusch (1976) ; Fraser
(1981), Haladyna, Shaughnessy, & Redsun (1982) ; and Schug, Todd, and
Beery. (1984) Students continue to complain that the subject matter is
boring, redundant, and yet complex, and the tests are difficult ; they are re-
quired to memorize far too much trivia; and teaching methods are routine,
dull, and dreary . They claim that social studies has little relevance in their
lives today and most certainly will have even less tomorrow . There is little in
social studies, they lament, that prepares them for their futures . Just as
disconcerting is the revelation in the 1981 Gallup Poll' that the public lacks
confidence in the quality of social studies teaching .
It would seem that such a lack is warranted . According to Shermis and
Barth (1982) most of what social studies classroom teachers do is simply
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"unsatisfactory." (p. 33) And, sadly enough, we should be less than optimis-
tic that improvement is around the corner . Teachers, over the years, have
gone and probably will continue to go their own ways, changing but very
little . (Shaver, Davis, & Helburn, 1979) What can be read into this is at least
one conclusion. Teachers and curriculum lay at the root of this malaise .
The quick fix for this malady in the social studies should be to improve
teacher practices in the classroom . Ways in which this fix has occurred have
varied during the recent years. During the sixties, many attempted to reform
the curricula that guided teaching . Most of these innovations had as a goal
active citizenship, a goal which was premised on two notions : one, that
critical thinking was a good and indispensable personal quality; and two,
that thoughtful and responsible social reform was proper for a citizen .
Critical thinking was argued to be the product of the careful study of the
content and methods of the social science disciplines and a classroom
teaching manner generally termed social inquiry. School initiated social
reform was considered to be justifiable and desirable because our future
citizens, the students of that day, would be knowledgeable in current social
affairs, would have an understanding of fundamental social science con-
cepts from which to make current social affairs meaningful, and could
therefore engage in personal and social problem solving . Hence, these re-
forming curricula were grounded in the social science disciplines and in a
curriculum design premised on issue resolution and an inquiry approach to
instruction. Once these innovations were in use in the classrooms, it was
thought, social studies would become relevant, significant, exciting, useful,
and enjoyable .
Unfortunately, few of these new curricula were used in the classrooms as
the developers intended they should . The tendency was for some teachers to
refuse to use these innovations outright, to co-opt those they did use so that
the `new' was transformed into the `old and familiar' in very short order,
and to abandon eventually those they did adopt . Simply, the curriculum in-
novators and implementors failed at their task ; classrooms and teachers
escaped reform . Social studies remained according to students, parents, and
social studies reformers, irrelevant in many ways, largely insignificant to the
daily lives of students, dreary, and not very useful .
Currently, the reform fix is focused on the personal and professional
development of the teacher rather than on what is now claimed to be the
earlier, more narrow focus on the 'curriculum-in-use' and `curriculum that
ought to be in use.' Many of today's classroom reformers advocate improve-
ment in teacher training practices and increased opportunities for on-the-
job teacher professional development . These two general solutions are
probably closer to the mark but the specifics remain unclear, and the atten-
tion away from social studies content seems to be a particularly inappropri-
ate one. Clearly, the content of the curriculum as well as the way it is
taught, are both a large part of the problem .
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Some are also attempting to develop standards for the preparation of
social studies teachers, perhaps in the hope that an awareness of desired
competencies and attitudes will bring about some improvements in class-
room practice. Those developed by the National Council for the Social
studies are a case-in-point . 2 However, these standards largely represent the
extant "values held by a profession" that has been unable to improve its
teacher practices and are so general in nature that they travel little beyond
broad, universals that are not very instructive about the nature of social
studies as a subject to be taught and the teacher's knowledge and skills
necessary to render this subject meaningful to students. (p . 357)
This attention to standards however does support the two hypotheses that
I formulated earlier . It is the teacher and the content that the teacher makes
available to the students that are the primary reasons for the less than de-
sirable state of social studies in the schools . However, the teacher must be
central to any attempt to improve the teaching of social studies . What this
attention to standards does remind us in a round-about way is that the ques-
tion of who should be and can be a social studies teacher is not only a salient
one, but is fundamental to any thoughts and practices relative to reform .
When we ask who should be and can be a social studies teacher, we are,
essentially, asking about rights and power . The one who has the right to be
a social studies teacher is therefore the one who should be a social studies
teacher. The one who can be a social studies teacher is the one who has the
ability to act because of these rights . In other words, this person is one who
has the power to do something in accordance with these rights. When we
talk about a teacher's rights and power we are, broadly speaking, talking
about a teacher's authority in the social studies classroom .
One conclusion can be drawn from my comments so far . Many teachers
do not have and should not have the authority to teach social studies. It is
my intention in this essay to elaborate on this claim, and in so doing to show
that the notion of teacher authority is a useful and fruitful one with which
to think about teaching practice, and to target on the primary problem that
must be addressed before social studies practices in the schools- can be
reformed .
Teacher Authority in the Classroom
Teachers have authority in their classrooms for two reasons . One, they
have the right to be there ; two, they have the ability to maintain that right .
When we acknowledge that a teacher has the right to be in the classroom,
we refer to a teacher's `de jure' authority ; when we acknowledge that a
teacher has the ability to get his or her "authority claims accepted by those
against whom they are asserted," namely students, we . speak of that teach-
er's `de facto' authority (Wolff, 1968, p . 604) `De jure' authority is being in
a position of authority that is justified in some way; `de facto' authority is
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the ability to effect actions, independent of the presupposition that the ac-
tions are justified .
There are three different but not mutually exclusive prior and necessary
conditions for a social studies teacher's `de jure' authority . The first is the
policies and procedural rules that are used in the governance of the schooling
institution in general and the individual schools in particular . The second is
the social and personal values that the institution of schooling and its cur-
riculum are to transmit to the future generations . The third is the social
studies curriculum guide (and its attendant, prescribed instructional
materials and achievement tests or examinations) . When a teacher acts in
accordance with prescriptions that emerge directly from these three sources,
then that teacher has the right to be in the classroom and therefore has the
right to teach social studies . In other words, the teacher is granted `de jure'
authority in the social studies classroom by virtue of these three conditions .
Before I move on to discuss `de facto' authority, a few comments on the
certainty of the prescriptions which justify `de jure' authority are in order .
The first and third sources are relatively free from misinterpretation and
ambiguity, although the specific prescriptions will vary from situation to
situation, and have varied, clearly, through time . However, the second con-
dition is problematic in that it is often quite uncertain as to what values the
school and the teacher are to transmit . The centuries old great debate rang-
ing around the purpose for schooling institutions is still ringing loudly, with
different positions championed by feisty debators . The social and personal
values that the schools, particularly the public schools, are to promulgate
will vary from camp to camp, generation to generation, and government to
government .
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that part of a teacher's role is the
socialization of the country's youth to a particular form of life. Prior to the
twentieth century, scientific, post-modern age, dimensions of this form of
life were captured in the content of the curriculum and in the proper forms
of social conduct guiding social relations in general and classroom interac-
tions in particular. The knowledge of the literati dominated the curriculum,
and this knowledge was, as Wilson (1962) put it, "suffused with social
values-a knowledge of religious texts and moral precepts ." (p . 16)
Knowledge that is the constituent of the school curriculum of the present,
whether social studies or otherwise, is of a more objective and scientific
character. Even those subjects that can be regarded as the stuff of the
literati, literature and history for instance, are approached by curriculum
developers in a scientific, objective fashion . Criticism and inquiry are the
espoused appropriate methods of instruction . The `new social studies' of the
sixties are a very good case-in-point . To a considerable extent, the values in-
imical to the form of life which the schools are to preserve and transmit
have become extrinsic to the content of the curriculum . Instead, these
values are to guide a teachers actions during instructional events . Because
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curricularists have recognized this, they have coined the expression the "hid-
den curriculum" and the "formal curriculum" which are recognized to exist
concurrently although not mutually exclusively in the classroom . Generally,
the hidden curriculum embraces the form that relations assume in the class-
room; the formal curriculum, the content of the curriculum and the
teaching strategies utilized to make this content available to students .
What seems to be generally agreed upon across most camps advocating
different purposes for schooling and hence different forms of life and ways
of being to be taught, is that the teacher is a powerful role model for stu-
dents. Therefore, teachers necessarily must be a representative of this form
of life and way of being. Teachers are expected to model forms of social
conduct that are in vogue not only in the classroom, but in their lives be-
yond the school . Typically, teachers are expected to model the parent and
the supervisor (depending on the age of the students) in the classroom,
schoolyard, and lunchroom; to model desirable patterns of family living,
and in some instances to model proper forms of religious practices ; to model
democratic practices in their professional and community endeavours ; to
model practices of fair play, consideration for others, toleration of and ap-
preciation for others culturally and racially different from themselves .
When teachers practice according to the principles of social conduct cap-
tured in the desirable, current role model for a teacher, then that teacher has
partial `de jure authority by virtue of fulfilling one of the three conditions
for such authority .
To reiterate briefly, then, the social studies teacher's `de jure' authority
has three not mutually exclusive and somewhat ambiguous conditions for
its legitimacy: the policies and procedural rules that guide the governance of
the schooling institution in general and individual schools in particular ; the
social and personal values that the school and the teacher are to transmit ;
and the curriculum guide and its concomitant, materials, pedagogical prac-
tices, and achievement tests .
`De jure' authority is in one sense institutional in that it is legitimized and
granted in accordance with the general rules of and justification for the
schooling institution . In another sense, `de jure' authority is professional in
that it is legitimized and granted in accordance with what is considered to be
professional knowledge, that is, knowledge of the curriculum and
pedagogical practices appropriate, and knowledge of proper professional
ethics. However, the general rules of and justification for the institution are
in one way a prescription for what -professional knowledge is considered
legitimate. A case in point is the current debate ranging around the teaching
of creationism and/or evolution theory in the schools . The claim from the
evolution camp is that evolution theory is not only valid knowledge but,
when incorporated into the school's curriculum, is ipso facto professional
knowledge. However, in actuality, it becomes professional knowledge only
when sanctioned via schooling policy and procedural rules . In another
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sense, `de jure' authority is normative because the schools embrace and
perpetuate a particular form of life and way of being that basically tend to
reflect the consensus of the diverse value positions in the society, with the
majority or most powerful position mirrored most strongly . A teacher who
is granted `de jure' authority by school policy makers is, by virtue of such
granting, provided with reasons for his or her right to be in the social studies
classroom .
Nonetheless, having the right to be in authority does not guarantee that a
teacher is able to EFFECT AUTHORITY ACTIONS . It is those against
whom the authority is exercised who must consent first to the authority
figure's directives, and then, second, consent to act accordingly . A social
studies teacher may have the right to be in the classroom, but must have his
or her `de jure' authority recognized and accepted by those against whom it
is asserted, the students . It is a teacher's `de facto' authority, rather than his
or her `de jure' authority, that enables a teacher to alter the students' cog-
nitive, affective, and physical states . A teacher's `de facto' authority is
justified not in rights, but in power and consent : power exercised by the
teacher and consent granted by the students . A teacher may have `de jure'
authority, and yet have no power and garner no consent .
An example to demonstrate the discrimination between the two types of
authority may be useful . Imagine a riot on the streets of Atlanta . The city
police are soon on the scene . The police have `de jure' authority by virtue of
their social role as law enforcer . Unfortunately, the police are unable to
quell the riot, and the lawbreakers carry on with their disruptive behavior,
ignoring police directives to break it up and return home . Matters reach new
heights of lawlessness and the police are pushed forcefully aside . Clearly,
the Atlanta police do not have, in this example, `de facto' authority . They
lack the power to effect the consent of the troublemakers because only they
can grant the police such authority .
A social studies teacher must have `de facto' authority . Without such
authority the teacher will not be able to effect student learning . `De facto'
authority is grounded partly in terms of the teacher's `de jure' authority
clearly, but is earned in terms of his or her ability TO CREATE THE CON-
DITIONS WITHIN WHICH STUDENTS WILL CONSENT TO LEARN
SOCIAL STUDIES. `De jure' authority entitles a teacher to the use of
legitimate power, and having such power enables a teacher to act on his or
her intentions and accomplish his or her goals . When a teacher has `de facto'
authority, that teacher is exercising LEGITIMIZED POWER. When stu-
dents refuse to acquiese to a teacher's requests which are justified, then, to
use Nyberg's (1981) phrase, the students have exercised power over power
because power is "delegated through consent, and without consent power
inevitably is reduced to force, and thus eventually is lost ." (p . 46)
To exercise `de facto' authority, a teacher must create the social and psy-
chological conditions within which consent can be granted . There are three
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dimensions of a student's consent : acceptance of a teacher's `de jure' author-
ity and the teaching plans that are justified by this authority ; willingness to
cooperate in the means to implement the teaching plans; and an understand-
ing and valuing of that to which the consent was granted, namely the con-
tent of and objectives for instruction. Acceptance, cooperation, under-
standing and valuing . When these three states are reached by the student,
then the teacher can said to have been effective, successful, or what ever
other expression we choose to use to indicate that goals have been reached .
The Goals of Social Studies
There is wide agreement in the field of social studies, among teachers as
well as reformers, that the desired ends for social studies teaching are active
citizenship and critical thought . While I and many others differentiate be-
tween these two purposes, it can be argued that active citizenship presup-
poses critical thinking .
The problem of curriculum content justification is central to the question
of what to teach in social studies . There are, simply arguing, two grounds
upon which we can justify curriculum content . Some content can be argued
to be worthwhile because it is culturally relevant in some way . Such content
justification is not independent of the persons making this claim and the
context within which they are living. Relevance is interwoven with the no-
tion of use, so when some content bit is claimed to be useful, what is usually
meant is that the content will be useful to the students today or tomorrow
and to the society in which they live or which they will help to maintain or
reform some time in the future. Making this content choice involves predict-
ing the possible and desirable or good future and involves a position on the
way our youth ought to live in this future .
Not all knowledge, however, which is taught in schools can be argued to
be useful. Many have claimed that advanced calculus, the study of Latin
and Greek, the acquisition of a foreign language, the study of ancient
history, the study of partical physics, say, are not relevant to the lives of
school students today, nor tomorrow . Granted, some students may become
nuclear physicists, archeologists, Latin scholars, or perhaps mathemati-
cians. One or two may make a small fortune winning at games of the pursuit
of trivia or recognizing a Tom Thompson or an A . Y . Jackson at an art auc-
tion in rural Ontario . The point is that the argument for the justification of
some knowledge is very weak indeed or nonexistent if lodged in claims of
relevance and usefulness. Yet, few would argue that the content itemized
above is worthless or valueless, or that a particular type of person would be
the result of the acquisition of such knowledge . The argument for justifica-
tion rests not on claims that the knowledge is useful for the realization of
some further end, but because it is good in and of itself . That is, it is intrin-
sically rather than instrumentally valuable .
The arguments to justify the intrinsic worth of the knowledge embraced
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in the school curriculum, that is, the curriculum content are a little beside
the point here. What is important to recognize is that, given the nature of
social studies, which is different in many ways from that of, say, history or
sociology or geography, curriculum content, of necessity, must be in-
strumentally worthwhile rather than intrinisically worthwhile . Hence the
ends of social studies must incorporate some dimension of relevance and
use, which is not necessarily the case with history and the others . The ends
of the study of history, for example, are most properly the development of a
particular type of critical thinking loosely termed historical mindedness .
This difference between principles of content justification and ends enables
us to discriminate between a curriculum and teaching that is social studies
and that which is something else . Therefore, the ends of the study of social
studies have a dimension of personal and social relevance and usefulness
that is necessarily consistent with the curriculum content and its justifica-
tion. Western culture is premised largely on norms of shared power, par-
ticipation, progress, and reform . Consequently, these norms permeate the
cultural milieux to which the social studies is to be relevant and for which it
is to be useful . Students in schools are not to be solely socialized to their
culture, but in some way are to make it better . Students are not only ex-
pected to be citizens, but to be active in their participation in and their im-
provement of their society's various institutions . Such participation and
reform require an intelligent and knowledgeable citizenry . In short, citizens
must be able to think critically. The schooling institution is one place within
which the development of critical thinking skills can occur. Hence, the dual
goals of the social studies, critical thought and active citizenship . Both
presuppose a democratic form of life and an educated person as citizen, and
the means of these ends is curriculum content having instrumental worth .
With such espoused and noble goals and useful curriculum content, it is
difficult to imagine how the social studies could fail to be an exciting and
significant subject to study . While critical thinking can obviously be
developed through the study of other school subjects, the juxtaposition of
the two goals, critical thinking and active citizenship, should render social
studies the most relevant of all curriculum areas . Perhaps social studies
should have a core and compulsory status. Such a curriculum should be ap-
preciated and enjoyed by all students . Such a happy state, alas, is certainly
not the case .
One reason for this is obvious . Critical thinking and active citizenship are
not the goals of social studies when it is practiced in the schools. Such talk
rings more of idle rhetoric rather than of fact . In fact, according to Shermis
and Barth (1982) quite the contrary is the case . They claim that most social
studies classrooms are places in which passive acquisition of recipe knowl-
edge and character indoctrination are the ends and a dreary manner of
teaching, consisting of study sheets requiring the recall of trivial subject
matter, workbooks, text memorization, and solitary seatwork, is the means .
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Active citizenship and critical thought are, ends which are grounded in one
indispensable human state, that of the questing after the nature of social
studies knowledge . To engage in critical thinking about social studies mat-
ters, teachers must have some understanding of the epistemological state of
social studies knowledge. The question of what constitutes valid knowledge
in social studies, how that validity is determined, and how the knowledge is
created are three essential questions that must be the focus for any cur-
riculum content planning deliberations and instructional decisions in the
.;lassroom . This understanding is fundamental to the teacher's ability to
select valid knowledge from invalid knowledge and to enable his or her
students to do the same. This understanding is fundamental if one, either
student or teacher, is to move from "having knowledge of" something to
"having understanding about" something .
According to Barth and Shermis (1982), social studies teachers tend to
believe that all reality can be reduced "to verbal propositions which can be
phrased in terms of short and succinct sentences ." (p. 19) Teachers believe
that there is an objective reality that can be known, and that the truth of this
reality is lodged in such authority sources as professors, research reports,
and most important, textbooks. Teachers do not see themselves as creators
of knowledge about this reality, but borrowers and disseminators of knowl-
edge about this reality that they have gleaned from someone else . Other
people create knowledge ; not teachers or students . This knowledge is cap-
tured in one type of language, assertive language, that does not enable
teachers to discriminate well among facts, concepts, generalizations, judge-
ments, evaluations, values, opinions, and so on. Finally, teachers tend to
believe that all reality is capable of being known and capable of being com-
pressed "to assertions that are either true or false, correct or incorrect, right
or wrong." (Shermis and Barth, 1982, p. 20) Teachers are generally inclined
to treat all curriculum items "as equally certain and equally factual," (p . 21)
and to believe that "there are quick and clean answers to all questions ."
(p. 27) These same teachers believe that distinguishing among levels of
probability, empirical statements, and value judgements are unnecessary
and even silly activities. Teachers perceive themselves as teaching accord-
ing to four principles: making verbal claims, avoiding biasing students,
presenting facts, and allowing students to form their own opinions . It was
apparent to Barth and Shermis (1982) that these teachers refuse "to undergo
the intellectual effort necessary to distinguish between facts and opinions,"
and instead to indoctrinate "students in whatever is taken to be truth and
beauty ." (p . 21)
The social studies classroom is a setting, as Luke, de Castell, and Luke
(1983) explain, in which conventional classroom discourse is to a con-
siderable extent based on the content enshrined in the texts, about the texts,
and mediated through them . Much of the bond that links teacher with stu-
dents is the text. The very formality of the school as a distributor of socially
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accepted knowledge and whose specific purpose is the facilitation of learn-
ing enhances the legitimacy of this materially-encased `truth .' The institu-
tional sanctioning of this knowledge tends to put it above criticism .
Consistent with their ontological and epistemological positions, teachers
presuppose that their students are passive, reactive, and responders rather
than active initiators. The majority of questions teachers ask are of a low-
level, recall type that require of students memorizations of copious amounts
of information. Students are not involved in any form of self-evaluation ;
rather teachers assume this responsibility using criteria of which they are
not always consciously aware . Teachers assume that learning is something
that happens TO students, with teaching as something that is done TO
students .
All of this stands in stark contrast to a manner of teaching, an understand-
ing of epistemology, and an ontological position that are consistent with the
goals of active citizenship and critical thought . Such goals must be com-
plemented by a critical manner of teaching in which debate and doubt reign
supreme'; an awareness of the uncertain nature of knowledge; the role of
each individual in refashioning extant formalized and socially derived
knowledge, and in developing personal knowledge; that learning is some-
thing students do and that it is an active and creative process; that there is a
reality which exists within as well as one that exists without, and that the
one without can never be known totally or certainly ; that the differences
between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge are not tidy, nor are
they easily and readily or even certainly distinguishable ; that there are
various ways in which these two types of knowledge can be known, pro-
trayed, and communicated; that the quest for "truth" is a moving away
from opinion and to valid knowledge and that there are many ways in which
this process can occur; that both subjective and objective knowledge can be
valid; that the different forms of knowledge have different tests for validity ;
and that there is a difference between having knowledge and having under-
standing . Because of their ontological, epistemological, and psychological
positions, the pedagogy practiced by most social studies teachers prevents
the realization of the desired goals of critical thinking and active citizenship,
and in fact replaces them with goals of information acquisition, values in-
doctrination, and passive citizenship .
A Target, A Coda, and a Conclusion
There are two possible responses to the previous description and analysis
of the state of social studies teaching. One is to accept teachers as they are,
to reformulate social studies goals, and in so doing to forfeit critical think-
ing and active citizenship as possible and desirable ends . This seems simply
undesirable and foolish for members of a democracy existing in a very
troubled and complex world . It also seems to be a betrayal of those students
who suffer, and not gladly, in their social studies classrooms . The other is to
do something about the way social studies teachers think and act .
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While the second response is the sensible and desirable one, and one in
which most social studies professors and curriculum developers and most
school administrators are in loud agreement, there is little consensus as to
how this can be accomplished . My purpose in writing this article is not to
offer prescriptions for solution, but rather a target at which to aim our
thinking .
The majority of our social studies teachers do not have the authority to be
in their classrooms . They have been granted `de jure' authority, but are
unable to earn `de facto' authority from their students . In other words, these
teachers are unable to create the conditions within which students are ABLE
to think critically and to practice active citizenship . In order for this to hap-
pen, a teacher necessarily must be AN AUTHORITY ON THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF SOCIAL STUDIES. As an essential prerequisite for the
students' granting of `de facto' authority, the teacher must demonstrate an
intimate knowledge and understanding of the content, clearly beyond that
ensconced in the curriculum and must be able to create conditions within
which students are truely able to become engaged in the learning tasks and
to understand the content .
To be AN AUTHORITY, the teacher must have some understanding of
the epistemology of social studies knowledge and of the processes indispens-
able to the acquisition of this knowledge as curriculum content . As an
authority of social studies content, which is clearly different in breadth of
knowledge and kind of understanding than simply having knowledge of the
prescribed curriculum, the teacher will necessarily have a different under-
standing of pedagogy and will engage in practices quite different from those
that are typical of most social studies teaching . Teaching as telling will
clearly be regarded as inappropriate to a curriculum having critical thinking
about social studies matters as means . Teaching as passing on authority
justified `truths' will be anathema to a teacher who is engaged in a process of
developing understanding with his or her students . Student as conduit
through which truth is poured surely is antithetical to the understanding of
the psychology of learning that would have to underpin instructional events
that enables a teacher to earn `de facto' authority in the social studies class-
room .
In sum, social studies teaching is in need of improvement, drastic im-
provement. Improving teacher practices is the focus for the raison d'etre of
the literature on teacher effectiveness .' However, the claims emerging from
this body of research have much to do with observable teacher and student
behavior such as time on task, wait time, academic engaged time, student
management, and the like, with many of the prescriptions couched in no-
tions of efficiency and teacher competencies . These claims and prescriptions
are useful in that they give some guidance as to how a teacher could earn `de
facto' authority in the classroom. However, they are of secondary impor-
tance if we are seeking ways to improve a teacher's performance . What the
researchers on teacher effectiveness fail to address is the question of a
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teacher's content knowledge, and more important, a teacher's knowledge of
epistemology . Indirectly though, some of their conclusions do speak to this
matter. Effective teachers, it seems, ask more higher order questions during
instruction than do less effective teachers . However, no relationship be-
tween type of question asked and critical thought as goal is established .
Also, the more effective teacher is more likely to amplify discussions once
the higher order question is asked and answers attempted, and to give feed-
back to the student responders . What can be inferred from this is that the
effective teacher, to be able to extend student discussion on the question
and to ask a higher order question in the first place, had to have a degree of
mastery of the subject matter greater than that the less effective teacher .
Teacher `de facto' authority in the classroom should therefore be primarily
justified in the teacher's understanding of the epistemological state of the
subject matter of social studies . The more EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY the
teacher has, the more `de facto' authority the teacher should be able to earn .
We must target the teacher's knowledge of epistemology as central to and
fundamental in the quest for teacher reform in social studies .
Such a position on teacher reform I hope should speak more loudly to
those engaged in teacher pre-service and in-service training than it does to
teachers in the classroom. I also hope that there are some echoes that might
have far reaching implications to the current, volatile debate on the ques-
tion of what should occur in our teacher preparation institutions and what
the most effective methods are for professional development. Considerably
more attention must be directed to the epistemic dimension of a teacher's `de
facto' authority in the classroom . We cannot confuse, nor can teachers con-
fuse, claims of `de jure' authority with those of `de facto .' Familiarizing
teachers with the content of the curriculum is not sufficient to enable
teachers to bring much understanding to the epistemological state of the
knowledge they are to teach . Familiarization with the textbook is clearly
just as inadequate. And, focusing on instructional techniques, while impor-
tant, most surely is secondary to the essential and primary target .
It is becoming accepted that one of the major reasons why the `new social
studies' reforms of the sixties and early seventies failed was not so much
because of poor implementation strategies, which was originally thought to
be the case . Rather, it was mainly because teachers did not understand the
epistemological state of the new content they were to teach . The reformers
either presumed that teachers did have `de facto' authority in their class-
rooms , or could acquire it through the use of the curriculum. Both pre-
sumptions were largely in error. Perhaps implicit here is a new considera-
tion for researchers on innovation implementation to address and just a
small hint at the focus and shape of implementation theories to come .
One cannot legitimately claim to be a social studies teacher without hav-
ing both types of teacher authority ; that is both `de jure' and `de facto' are
necessary to the right to be in the classroom and to having the power to
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maintain that right . Unfortunately, most of our teachers do not have such
authority . Those that do, surely, have classrooms that are home to critical
thought and active citizenship . Those that do not must face the realization
that there cannot be, nor should there be any comforting excuses when our
social studies students have not learned, or have learned that which is
useless, silly, invalid, or immoral .
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The only freedom that is of enduring importance
is freedom of intelligence . . .
J. Dewey, 1938
One of the most crucial issues of our day is the continuing proliferation
of nuclear arms. Above all, this issue threatens our immediate existence and
continues to be a massive drain upon the public purse . In response to the
arms race an international movement has emerged advocating some form of
control of this deadly escalation . Recently, arguments have been made by
groups advocating such controls (such as the Boston-based Educators for
Social Responsibility) that the movement to limit nuclear arms become part
of the social studies .
The nuclear freeze movement is, indeed, useful curricular material . This
is not to suggest that students should study the nuclear freeze movement
simply to take a position on the arms race . Rather, the issue forces teachers
to confront how they will teach about democracy : It raises fundamental
questions about what democracy means both in theory and in practice in the
United States . These questions form the core of this project : What is meant
by democracy? What do schools currently do to educate for, or perhaps
against, democracy? What should schools do in order to foster in students a
democratic attitude?
In what follows I hope to answer those questions . Initially, this means
making a choice among competing interpretations of democracy as an
organizing principle for schools . Secondly, how schools currently operate
within a psuedo-democratic rationality will be explored . Finally, and most
centrally for this paper, what schools need to do in order to foster
democracy will be discussed, using the recent anti-nuclear arms protests as a
source for teaching about democracy .
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Democracy: Protectionist or Participatory
Democracy is a term frequently invoked as both an organizing principle
for our collective social lives and as rationale for public education. Yet
often absent from discussions relying upon democracy is a definition of the
concept itself. It is assumed that the way our social and political structures
currently function suffices as an operational definition of democracy . What
such assumptions miss is the fact that competing versions of democracy ex-
ist, each with its own normative framework within which to judge the
democratic or anti-democratic nature of social institutions . The two major
versions of democratic theory are the classical (participatory) and contem-
porary (protectionist) .
Contemporary democratic theory has attempted to eliminate apparent
defects of classical democratic theory .' According to Pateman (1970) recent
democratic theory has at its heart two crucial concerns : First, that classical
theory, which rested heavily upon public participation in the governing pro-
cess, is obsolete due to the inability of the populace to actually participate .
Second, the fear of totalitarianism arises from the belief that mass par-
ticipation would predicate a collapse of democracy . These arguments draw
heavily from the experience of the Weimar Republic in which it is claimed
that increased political participation by low socio-economic status groups
without democratic attitudes brought about a collapse into totalitarianism .
Schumpeter (1943) first argued that classical democratic theory rested
upon empirically unrealistic grounds which ignored undemocratic attitudes
among the populace . Given such an attitudinal problem, fundamentally a
desire to absolve onself of decision-making responsibility in favor of the
protective decisions of a `leader', Schumpeter proposed that democracy
could best function as a competition among decision makers for public sup-
port. Thus, classical theory was abandoned for a theory based upon
popular selection of elite decision makers (who seem to mirror members of
the economically elite classes) as opposed to direct decision making itself .
Continuing the transformation from participatory to protective
democratic theory, Berelson (1952) argued that not only were the masses
willing to abdicate decision-making responsibilities, but were generally
politically apathetic . Citizens took little or no interest in decisions which did
not directly influence them . Thus, non-participation takes on a positive
dimension as it prevents those with limited interest and expertise from
creating undue stress on the system . By limiting demands and, thus, con-
flict, the stability of the democratic system is preserved . Those very
elements which presumably have the least democratic attitudes, lower socio-
economic status groups, participate less than anyone else as they have less at
stake (generating more apathy) than other segments of the populace .
Dahl (1956) completed the transition of democratic theory from par-
ticipatory to protectionist . His argument was that the most important or
distinguishing element of a democratic system is the election process
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through which non-elites choose governing elites . These representatives of
the public then set and act upon a political agenda .through which all major
public decisions are made . The public is to verify that their political elites
are protecting self- or group-interests . The role of the citizenry in this model
is the making of leadership choices, not decision themselves, in order to
protect their perceived best interests .
Not only are citizens removed from direct decision-making in protectionist
theory, the very range of what are considered political issues is severely
limited . Those issues which deal with the structure of the capitalist order,
private ownership of capital, distribution of income and wealth, plant
relocation, etc ., are deemed not to be part of political debate (Pateman,
1970) . Rather, the interests to be protected must operate within the existing
economic structure . Again, the dual concerns of stability and efficiency
predominate contemporary theory. The assumption is that excessive debate
over the nature of the economic system would not only threaten the system's
stability but would additionally hamper the efficient economic machine .
The argument can be made that contemporary democratic theory is an ac-
curate description of the current American political context . Indeed, those
who gain the least from the current economic and social order are the least
likely to vote . The social system is thus guaranteed relative stability as issues
of concern to non-voters, frequently economic which might involve an
alteration of existing economic structures, are not addressed . Additionally,
the role of citizens in Western democracies is largely limited to attendance at
the ballot box. Direct action on social issues such as picketing, protesting,
and democratic take-overs is widely discouraged as counter-productive or
only symbolic . Finally, while voters may pick political leaders they are mute
when it comes to the selection of economic decision makers .
Most recently, such an analysis of democracy has been put forth by one
of America's leading conservatives, George Will (1983) . Will argues that
non-voting is a virtue, indicating general satisfaction with the way things are
and preventing the intrusion into the electoral process by those with a non-
democratic attitude. Recent attempts to increase voter turn-out are wrong
headed and can only lead to the experience of the Weimar Republic . The
best democracy seems to be the least democracy as Will states :
In two presidential ballotings in Germany in 1932, 86 .2 and 83 .5 per-
cent of the electorate voted . In 1933, 88.8 percent voted in the
Assembly election swept by the Nazis . Were the 1932 turnouts a sign of
the health of the Weimar Republic? The turnout reflected the unhealthy
stakes of politics then; elections determined which mobs ruled the
streets and who went to concentration camps .
The fundamental human right is to good government . The fundamental
problem of democracy is to get people to consent to that, not just to
swell the flood of ballots . In democracy, legitimacy derives from con-
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sent, but nonvoting is often a form of passive consent . It often is an ex-
pression not of alienation but contentment . . . the stakes of our elec-
tions, as they affect the day-to-day life of the average American, are
agreeably low . (p. 96)
Public schooling in the United States has chosen to educate within this
protectionist framework . This would be fine were there no alternatives .
However, protectionist democracy is only one way of perceiving our collec-
tive democratic heritage . What follows is an attempt to recapture an alter-
native version of democracy to be used as an organizing principle for public
education .
Current democratic theory and practice are locked within a protectionist
rationality . That rationality favors limiting participation in governing pro-
cess to the elite and narrowing the scope of those issues deemed worthy of
the political process. The social toll of our protectionist theory is becoming
all too clear . Millions of the culturally disenfranchised recognize that they
are not wanted nor needed by the political system and abandon it . Elections
have become merely fund-raising contests and politics seem to be mainly an
attempt to bring out the darker side (the racist, sexist, fearful, selfish side)
of the electorate's protectionist nature .
As an alternative to such a system, educators, and others, might strive to
recapture the classical, participatory theory of democracy as an ideal for
which to strive . Pateman (1970) demonstrates such a framework's rationale
from Rousseau's The Social Contract: (1) Participatory systems are self-
sustaining because the very qualities required of citizens if such a system is
to work are those that participation itself fosters ; (2) participation increases
one's "ownership" over decisions thus making public decisions more accept-
able to individuals; and (3) participation has an integrative function-helping
individuals establish the feeling that they belong . These premises were fur-
ther developed by John Stuart Mill (1963, 1965) and G . D. H. Cole (1920) .
Mill argued that the primary consideration in judging a society or govern-
ment to be good was the effect that system had upon individuals . Rather
than concern himself with efficiency, as contemporary theorists are wont to
do, Mill argued that participatory democracy fostered within individuals
the psychological attributes needed in self-governance . In addition, Mill
and Cole argued that these characteristics are best developed at the local
level. Through such local participation citizens come to own decisions on an
immediate level and develop those skills and attitudes necessary for self-
governance at the national level .
What particularly is meant in referring to attributes needed for self-
governance? J . S . Mill argued that an active character would emerge from
participation and Cole suggested that a non-servile character would be
generated . What this means is that individuals should have the confidence
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that they are fit to govern themselves . The term often utilized to describe
such a state is known as a sense of political efficacy. That is, as Campbell, et
al. (1954) have pointed out, the belief that individual political action does
have an impact on decision-making and thus it is worthwhile to perform
one's civic duties .
There is empirical evidence to suggest that participation does enhance
feelings of political efficacy. Studies by Almond and Verba (1965), Carnoy
and Shearer (1980), and those cited by Wirth (1983), point out that par-
ticipatory models in local governments, workplaces, and associations do
lead to higher levels of participation in national politics . In all of these
studies local participation in self-governance increased a sense of control
over the immediate political environment and a concurrent desire to par-
ticipate in controlling the national political agenda .
Let us be clear about what is meant in these theories and studies when the
term participation is utilized . Three conditions must be obtained : First, the
participants must be in the position of decision-maker rather than decision
influencer; second, all participants must be in possession of, or have access
to, the requisite information on which decisions can be reached ; and third,
full participation requires equal power on the part of participants to deter-
mine the outcome of decisions . When individuals experience participation
in this sense at a local level the research suggests that they will gain a greater
sense of political efficacy in the national arena (see also Boyte, 1980) .
This implies that contrary to claims made by contemporary protectionist
theorists, democracy best functions as a lived process of participation, a
process in which citizens do not merely choose between elites but actually
transform themselves through debate and contestation over public issues .
This was the original vision of democracy upon which the foundations of
our political practice were laid. Additionally, as has been pointed out in
Wirth's (1983) review of workplace democracy it is a vision of democracy
which continues to be relevant as it humanizes shared social spheres, em-
powers democratic citizens, and leads to more effective and efficient
decision-making . Ongoing debate into how such participation is to be
facilitated in our evolving society is necessary (and has been undertaken by
Cohen and Rogers, 1983) . The point here is that participatory theory holds
us closer to a democratic society than does protectionist theory . 3
Educators need to realize that the social role they play depends upon the
conception of democracy, participatory or protective, they choose . On one
hand rests a conception of democracy within which the participation of the
minority elite is crucial and the non-participation of the apathetic ordinary
man is necessary to maintain the system's stability . On the other hand
democracy is conceived as encompassing the broadest participation of the
people working to develop political efficacy and a sense of belonging in
order to further extend and enhance more participation .
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Schooling for Protectionist Democracy
Over the past decade, educational historians and sociologists have worked
to uncover the hidden curriculum of schooling . Moving beyond the initial
forays into this area, concerned as they were with the celebration of schools
as reinforcers of dominant cultural values (Dreeben, 1968), this work has
revealed how schools work to perpetuate, or reproduce, an unequal social
order. The field of the social studies in particular has been singled out as ex-
isting primarily for the purpose of reinforcing cultural myths that protect
the status quo (Anyon, 1979 ; Fitzgerald, 1979; Giroux, 1983a; Popkewitz,
1977) . This work on the reproductive nature of schooling has focused,
through theoretical and empirical research, on the mechanisms of power
and domination at play in the school setting .
More precisely, the school is seen in such research as performing four
functions vital to the continued stability of the current order .' First, and
foremost, the school, through both overt and covert means, strives to
legitimate the existing systems of economic, political, and social inequality .
This is accomplished by, secondly, celebrating a very limited sense of
democracy within which issues of economic power and power-lessness are
not raised. Third, knowledge itself is reified, presented in a psuedo-
scientific manner which removes it from contestation or debate . Finally,
schooling works to elevate only certain cultural formations as legitimate
thus relegating to the dustbin of history oppositional social/cultural forma-
tions . These four mechanisms represent the ways in which schooling
reproduces a system of social inequality (capitalism) in a nation with a credo
of political equality (democracy) .
Seen within the framework of protectionist democracy, such schooling
makes impeccable sense. Turning to the field of civic education the reflec-
tion of contemporary protectionist democracy appears all too clearly . Civic
education may, for the most part, be described as under the either citizen-
ship transmission or a social science approach (Giroux, 1983a) . In both
models knowledge is assumed to be value free and democracy a concept
limited to only a few public spheres . With the former, the idea is that
students will learn, through reading or simulation, the appropriate role of a
citizen . Such a role is best demonstrated by Remy's Handbook of Citizen
Competencies (1980) in which the emphasis seems to be upon making
citizens safe for democracy . This is done by only endorsing political tools
and citizen activities which fit within the current democratic rationality such
as voting, letter writing, interest group formation and the like . In addition,
those elements explicitly feared by contemporary democratic theorists for
their destabilizing impact upon the system, lower socio-economic status
groups in particular, are seldom if ever addressed (a similar critique could
be made of Shaver, 1977, and Newmann, 1975) .
This reflection of contemporary theory in the citizenship transmission
model is further illustrated in the explicit content of citizenship education
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programs. The emphasis is often upon choosing leadership elites wisely
and holding them responsible . Seldom is the content of such programs
devoted to the actual making of decisions -the focus in on the once removed
step of choosing the decision makers . Second, the social studies content in
general is filled with examples of great men (or sometimes women) making
decisions -infrequently are examples of common people banding together
to change their lives and circumstances through direct decision making
presented . Third, the Western democratic system itself seemingly removed
from scrutiny . Once it passes muster in comparison to Soviet totalitarianism
(not to be confused with South African authoritarianism) the protectionist
democracy of the West is fully embraced . Nary a word is mentioned in the
curriculum of the potential contradictions between capitalism and democ-
racy, the system's need for non-participation, or the limits on decision mak-
ing .
The social science model, while it goes beyond the notions of citizenship
transmission by seeming to make students active and creative thinkers,
recycles the very assumptions of citizenship transmission it seeks to redress .
This is because notions of critical thinking and social conflict slip away
before the priestly chairs of the scientific experts . While claims are made
that students "choose" solutions in response to social problems about which
they are inquiring, the deck is stacked in favor of technocratic solutions
proposed by experts . Thus, social problems are not resolved on an
historical, political, or normative terrain over which varying notions of
right and wrong are put forth outside of objective scientific knowledge . In-
stead, students face a cookbook approach in which only certain knowledge
is legitimate and solutions to problematic situations are judged on their
technical rather than humane merits . The hidden messages are typified in
Popkewitz's critique of Fenton's Comparative Political Systems: An Inquiry
Approach .
Fenton's approach uses concepts of leadership, ideology, and decision
making to compare different political systems . However, investigation
of the text reveals that judgments are already made by the authors . The
purpose of children's "analytical" work is simply to make the teacher's
answers plausible . . . For example, a dichotomy is established between
the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States . The personal
characteristics of the U .S. political leaders are characterized as energy,
tact, ability to tend to many things at once, ability to operate effectively
under tension, and so on. On the other hand, a Soviet leader is described
as one "not given to resistance, who is a little above average in energy
and intelligence and below average in imagination ." Under the guise of
"social theory," a dichotomy is established which seems to prevent
critical scrutiny rather than nurture it . (Popkewitz, 1977)
How is it that an educational program such as civic education, stemming
from a genuine desire on the part of educators to help students as "educated
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citizen(s) act upon an unswerving loyalty to democratic ideals" (National
Educational Association, 1938) turns out to serve such a limited conception
of democracy? Here we come face to face with the paradoxical nature of
education's social role : in attempting to serve students the overriding logic
of the state directs educators to work at fitting students to the pre-existing
roles for them in the cultural, political, and economic matrix of post-
industrial capitalism .'
Of course, to adopt such role may, on the surface, make a great deal of
sense. But in the long run the roles and actions endorsed and embraced limit
and perhaps destroy the abilities, hopes, potentialities, and dreams students
have for a better world . Thus, civic education works to reproduce the
established social order through limiting the sphere of democratic opera-
tions and failing to develop the skills needed by democratic citizens to
critically examine claims to objective truth, to challenge the opinions of ex-
perts, and to utilize their own histories in both opposing the dominant order
and building a new one .
Part of the task involved in capturing the participatory essence of
democracy is to transform the school curriculum in ways that will endorse
participatory citizenship . This task might begin with teachers themselves
realizing the viability of participatory democracy . Teachers, faced daily
with protectionist limits upon their own lives through the teacher-proofing
of curriculum (Apple, 1982), external demands for standardized competency
tests, and the increased bureaucratization of schools, know intuitively the
reality of protectionist as opposed to participatory democracy . The hope is
that teachers can see their desires for greater autonomy in the classroom
within the larger context of the expansion of participatory democracy .
Understanding that they will be able to move toward direct control of their
own social conditions only when the culture at large moves beyond protec-
tionist democracy, perhaps the school itself can become an arena for par-
ticipatory action. Equipped with a sense of democratic possibility, consis-
tent with the most cherished image we hold of ourselves, teachers could
strive to make schools sites of democratic transformation .
Schooling for Participatory Democracy
What would it mean pedagogically if educators were to hold fast to par-
ticipatory democracy as an organizing principle for their work? Earlier I
argued that the rationale for utilizing the nuclear freeze movement as cur-
ricular material was that it illustrated both the limits and possibilities of
democratic practice. The particular function of such study would be to il-
luminate the reality of what democratic values the culture at large adheres
to as opposed to those it enshrines it our historical documents . That is, the
manner in which the expression of popular will through the nuclear freeze
movement has been treated by our federal government dramatically il-
lustrates how protectionist democracy denegrates the very cultural values
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upon which the republic is founded . It further illuminates the value of the
participatory alternative as a way of organizing social life .
It is important to locate this element of a curriculum for participatory
democracy within a larger educational framework . Previously (Wood,
1984) I have suggested that a pedagogy for participatory democracy would
include five components . First, schools need to help children develop
critical basic skills . This would be more than merely the "basics" as currently
conceived . Instead, inferred here are skills that draw from the work of
Freier (1970) and Dewey (1916, 1938) in using the lived experiences of
students to teach academic skills within a context of uncovering and naming
the ways in which democratic participation is limited . Second, schools need
to help students gain the ability to speak with their own voices . By
understanding their own histories, students could emerge from the school-
ing experience with the requisite cultural capital needed to believe in their
right to oppose, validate or change the given social order . Third, schools
need to expose students to alternatives in democratic living . The current
limitations of what is called "civic education" in reifying our manner of
republican democracy limits potential insights into alternative democratic
structures and thus belies the basic premise of democracy-government by
the people. Fourth, the authoritarian structure of the school itself needs to
be altered in ways that students (and perhaps teachers and parents as well)
might, in the best Deweyian sense, experience and thus learn about
democratic participation. Finally, truly democratic education (or education
for democracy) would work to foster in children the values inherent in
democracy and in our own democratic creed . This fifth educational task is
explored in detail here .
Usually educators are more than willing to claim they teach the democratic
values revered in our culture . On closer examination, however, these values
seem more like a listing of character traits needed for protectionist
democracy. Further, the teaching of such values often consists of one merely
exposing children to them as "goods" which are embraced by the society at
large. Little is said about the powerful anti-democratic forces in our society
to whom these values seemingly mean nothing . Thus, students are prepared
for a fairy-tale world where all men and women are equal, everyone is free
to speak their mind, and public participation in government is America's
legacy to the world . Those who then lose in the political process, or whose
voices go unheard, are relegated to the sidelines of history.as meaningless,
hopeless people who, presumably, had their chance to be heard .
This free-market theory of government in the United States overlooks the
many ways in which public participation in government is thwarted . Beyond
the ways in which such participation is crippled by illegal acts of govern-
ment agencies or direct suppression there is a subtler bias operating . It is, as
argued above, the belief that democracy is fundamentally a protective pro-
cess. Thus, in a host of ways active participation is decried as not really
within the rules of the game and denied either legitimacy or usefulness .
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In order to oppose this orientation teachers concerned with developing
participating citizens need to move beyond merely listing so-called
democratic values . Rather, they must focus on those civic values which are
the keys to participatory democracy, are deeply embedded in our demo-
cratic heritage, and are often overtly and covertly subverted by some of our
more powerful institutions . In so doing (in conjunction with the other four
pedagogic a tasks outlined above) we lay the groundwork for students to use
in defending their rights and exercising their responsibilities as participating
democratic citizens .
What are these civic values embedded in our cultural heritage that must
be called forth? I do not pretend to offer a complete listing, but in keeping
with the three conditions necessary for participation listed above I would
suggest the following five values . First, the values of a free press, free
speech, and the freedom to assemble and petition, found in the First
Amendment, seem fundamental to establishing the right of self-governance
and the guarantees of free access to information necessary for decision
making. Of course, the concept of the right of self-government is funda-
mentally what our Declaration of Independence is all about. Additionally,
the civic value of equality, also embedded in the Declaration, is crucial to
participatory government . Thus, we have begun to satisfy the first two parts
of this element of a curriculum for participatory citizenship by identifying
the necessary civic values and their legitimacy through identification with
key cultural documents . Attention is now turned to the actual teaching of
these elements, locating them within contested social terrain as legitimate
values that must be exercised in the face of opposition and protected from
usurpation not by force, but by ridicule . We return now to the nuclear
freeze movement as a pedagogical and curricular tool to carry out this
project .
Perhaps the clearest recent national, and even global example of attempted
citizen participation is the movement against nuclear arms . The usefulness
of this issue is not in teaching a particular position or, in fact, in teaching
how people make public policy (most popularly known as the sanitized
"How A Bill Becomes A Law" lesson) . Rather, what the nuclear freeze cam-
paign presents is an opportunity to see how, in a country with a government
for, by, and of the people, a popular position is virtually ignored by the
government . Additionally, it demonstrates how the civic values proposed
above are frequently violated by those in power. Rather than allow
movements such as these to be written off as much ado about nothing,
studying them can help students see how legitimate civic action by the
governed is ignored because it does not fit the pre-set views of governors .
By raising such questions students can see the limited role citizens are of-
fered in a protectionist democracy and begin to consider participatory
democracy as an alternative. How does the nuclear freeze campaign il-
luminate both the limitations of protectionist democracy and the promise of
participatory democracy?
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As Donner (1982) has pointed out, "the American past offers nothing in
the way of anti-government protest comparable to the nuclear freeze move-
ment in numbers, geographic scope, social and economic diversity, extent
of organizational involvement and depth of commitment" (p . 456). This
strength is demonstrated by the wide variety of communities and states
that have adopted pro-freeze resolutions, the number of institutional and
organizational endorsements of arms freezes or reductions, and the various
illuminati that endorse the movement . However, at this writing the United
States appears farther away from a nuclear arms reduction or freeze vis-h-
vis the Soviet Union than at any other time . How is this possible when a
1982 Harris poll found 86% of Americans surveyed in favor of some type of
strategic arms agreement, a 1983 Newsweek poll (Newsweek, January 31,
1983) found 64% of Americans surveyed favoring or strongly favoring a
bilateral ban on "all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear
weapons", and the June 12, 1982 demonstration for a nuclear freeze in New
York City drew nearly a million people making it the largest demonstration
in the United States? How is it possible, in the face of all of this, that White
House Counselor Edwin Meese can react to the U .S . House of Represen-
tatives' votes in favor of a freeze by saying (speaking for the Administra-
tion): "To us it's almost an irrelevancy in a sense, because it's not going to
affect policy" (U.S . News and World Report, April 25, 1983, p . 18)? The
lack of public policy response to the felt needs of the populace reflects the
opportunity for teachers to discuss with students the limitations of our cur-
rent conception of democracy .
Nuclear Arms Race as Subject Matter
Is the nuclear arms race legitimate subject matter? Given that students
face daily, through the media and other sources, the reality of the nuclear
threat and the anti-nuclear movement they make up what Dewey (1938)
would refer to as potentially educative experiences. That is, the issue of
nuclear disarmament is intrinsically motivating as it is common to the lived
experiences of children . Thus, nuclear disarmament provides educators
with an opportunity to provide problematic situations for students which
are educative in that by dealing with it students learn the `habit' of good
thought.
It could be argued that the issue of nuclear arms reduction is too technical
for students to understand . This implies two things . First, that the only peo-
ple qualified to discuss social issues are those who have all the information
available on the issue . This is precisely the fallacy that George Counts
(1932) pointed out over fifty years ago when he accused progressive educators
of attempting to
. . . produce the college professor, that is, the individual who adopts an
agnostic attitude towards every important social issue, who can balance
the pros against the cons with the skill of a juggler, who sees all sides of
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every question and never commits himself to any, who delays action un-
til all the facts are in, who knows that all the facts will never come in,
who consequently holds his judgment in a state of indefinite suspen-
sion, and who before the approach of middle age sees his powers of ac-
tion atrophy and is social sympathies decay . (p . 18)
Second, that the nuclear freeze is merely a technical, issue not subject to
public debate but rather best left in the hands of scientists . Yet there are
scientists, military personnel, and former White House cabinet members on
both sides of this issue. It is thus a political issue demanding the best
thought of the populace in its resolution . (Note how both of these argu-
ments work within the protectionist framework- denying the populace a
voice in the most crucial issue of our time .)
There are two ways in which democracy can be approached through ex-
amining the nuclear freeze movement, both mirroring the larger frame-
works of protectionsist and participatory democracy discussed above . In
order to fully understand educating for participatory democracy, how the
freeze movement could be understood within protectionist democracy will
be explored first . Initially, the protectionist analysis points out ways in
which the system, is working: "See, in the United States people can voice
their opinions . Unlike the Soviet Union where pro-freeze citizens (like
Sergei Batovvin) are censured, arrested, or deported ."
However, just because citizens have a say does not mean they get their
way. In fact, cooler heads at the capital must prevail on these issues . Thus,
while petition (protest) is a protected right exercised via other rights (speech,
press) it is essentially ineffectual and often a waste of time . When looked at
closely, most protest or citizens campaigns are merely gangs of malcontents
with nothing better to do .
Students do learn democracy in this manner- protectionist democracy .
While the tools of participation are nominally celebrated, they are usually
illustrated as being generally ineffectual . The class writes letters to their
congressperson (senator, governor, President) and receives in return form
letters and autographed pictures . Democracy is a spectator sport, in which a
few play with most of us cheering from the sidelines . The system functions
best in this fashion, as too many demands upon it might cause its general
collapse. So the protestors are kept at arms length, while technocrats
justifiably make the crucial decisions .
The alternative to such a vision is to see the freeze campaign as a genuine
expression of a segment (perhaps a majority) of the populace's will . Ex-
amining how current democratic rationality prevents such desires from
becoming public policy enables students to see the stifling nature of protec-
tionist democracy . Whether or not they want to accept that rationality is a
personal decision . The obligation of the teacher is to present participatory
democracy as an alternative form of public life .
The place to begin such an investigation is with the means utilized by the
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freeze campaign . Up to this point freeze proponents have utilized the tools
of participation available to them: members of the movement have
peaceably assembled, petitioned, spoken, written, even engaged in civil
disobedience to make their point . In so doing, the movement provides an
excellent example of the civic values inherent in a participatory democracy .
However, the analysis cannot stop there or students may generate a sense of
cynicism as such action does not seem to effect the system (see Drier's, 1980,
discussion of this syndrome) . This is where the endorsement of democratic
values as I am suggesting goes beyond typical civic education programs .
What teachers need to do is demonstrate to students that while participation
is legitimated in our cultural heritage, our current limited sense of
democracy functions to both discredit and occasionally even stop participa-
tion.
Attempts to discredit the freeze movement have come from prominent
government officials and the national media . As for the government, the
refrain echoed by all Administration officials is that the freeze movement is
merely the inspiration of the Soviet Union . As President Reagan himself has
said: October 4, 1982-The freeze campaign is "inspired by not the sincere,
honest people who want peace, but by some who want the weakening of
America and so are manipulating honest people and sincere people" (Donner,
1982); November 11, 1982-"The Soviet Union has penetrated the nuclear
freeze movement and is using it for its own aims" (The Nation) ; August 23,
1983 - The freeze campaign is engaged in "hype and theatrics" and is similar
to "the Nazi sympathizers" who weakened pre-World War II Germany (The
Detroit Free Press) .
These public pronouncements are coupled with attempts at discrediting
individuals who exercise the freedoms we all value . One example of this is
the attempt at suppressing Presidential Scholar Ariela Gross's presentation
of a petition in favor of the nuclear freeze during an award ceremony at the
White House (Gross, 1983) . As for actually attempting to stop participa-
tion, the examples of state-sanctioned oppression are harder to locate, but
are present just the same . For example, the harsh court sentences recently
given anti-nuclear demonstrators (Newsweek, July 11, 1983). Or a related
example, the deliberate media black-out by the Administration the invasion
of Grenada.
The media seem implicated in this attempt to discredit the freeze move-
ment as they plaster the most bizarre or obscene images of the freeze move-
ment across television screens and magazine covers (see Newsweek's Oc-
tober 24, 1983 issue for a classic example) . Such coverage mirrors the
media's treatment of anti-Vietnam War protestors which worked, as Gitlin
(1980) claims, to delegitimize the movement and it aims .
Such attempts at limiting, or at least discrediting, participation are best
seen as instances where our protectionist reality confronts' our participatory
heritage. Those who attempt to directly affect policy are "out of their
league" as it were. They are venturing into arenas best left to policy experts
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and political elites chosen for such tasks . Thus, their participation, while
tolerated, is seen as counter-productive if not subversive and certainly in-
spired by those who would destroy our political system .
The function of drawing these examples into the discussion of the nuclear
freeze movement is not to encourage students to take a positive pro or con
the freeze . But rather to demonstrate how participation is actually
subverted in our current democratic structure . Only by doing so will
students see the ways protectionist democracy actually limits the very
freedoms we all claim to embrace . In fact, those who fear that the nuclear
freeze campaign threatens democracy as we currently practice it are indeed
correct: If the people believe they can govern themselves why rely on the
winners of our electoral beauty contests? Thus, the function of drawing out
the contradiction between our protectionist reality and our participatory
heritage is to present students with a choice .
Certainly students may choose the cynics' way out : The freeze campaign
really is not making any difference so why attempt to adopt a participatory
stance? Responding to such a position requires teachers draw on both
historical and current reality . The recent history of anti-war protest in the
Vietnam era depicts graphically how such participation altered public policy
(Gitlin, 1983) . The freeze campaign, while not yet totally successful, has
not only affected the Administration's arms policy but has made nuclear
armaments one of the major issues in the Democratic presidential primaries .
Citizen action in and of itself has had dramatic affects across the country in
a variety of arenas (Boyte, 1980; Herbers, 1983) . Cynicism is factually un-
sound and teachers are obligated to point this out to their students .
Alternatively, students may be willing to argue that the freeze campaign
illuminates the wrong-headedness of the populace at large . The answer to
such ill-advised action being the adoption of a system that is even less
democratic but perhaps more efficient (e.g . fascism) . The obligation of the
teacher is again to confront students with the historical and current reality
of such claims . Would they be willing to live and serve in Hitler's Germany
or Mussolini's Italy? At what cost did these cultures achieve their so-called
efficiency- and at what were they efficient? How does the claim of effi-
ciency for more authoritarian systems actually square with current social
practice? What does one do with evidence that in many cases greater par-
ticipation leads to greater efficiency (Wirth, 1983)? Finally, can those
systems which blatantly over-ride the rights of the individual be in any way
remotely justifiable with the credo and founding documents of our
republic?
Fundamentally, what students face when confronted with the reality of
the freeze movement is a question of political equality . Earlier I argued that
equality should be a central civic value explored in teaching for par-
ticipatory democracy . What this means in this context is helping students
see that in protectionist democracy some (usually those of higher SES
status) are more equal than others . The question we must ask is if this is in-
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deed what we mean by democracy? If not, would participatory democracy
make more sense and how would we work to realize it?
In these ways the nuclear freeze movement serves as a tool to use with
students in exploring the civic values fundamental to a participatory democ-
racy and how our current protectionist rationality violates them . Addi-
tionally, the possibility of political equality and the actualization of our
fundamental civic values within participatory democracy is revealed. The
transformative powers of such a process are grounded in each child's reality
of power and powerlessness within our limited democracy .
Conclusion
What has been argued is that participatory democracy should replace
protectionist democracy as the organizing principle for civic education .
Such a claim was justified through an examination of the two primary
theories of democracy and evidence for both interpretations . Pedagogic
tools for this form of civic education were explored and one, the teaching
of civic values, was considered using the nuclear freeze movement as an
example.
Certainly, we need to continually examine the concept of participation,
attempting to understand how a changing social reality (for example the
technological revolution) may demand new forms of participatory theory .
But this is not to deny that fundamental to such an examination is the con-
tinuing role direct citizen participation plays in democracy . Even today the
society is being pushed in a more participatory direction :
Thousands of new pressure groups organized around single issues . . .
nuclear-freeze advocates, for example -are bringing about a profound
change in American government, away from a representative system
and toward a more directly participatory one . (Herbers, 1983)
Educators concerned with democracy's future in this country need to be
aware of the meaning of this transformation with regard to the students
they teach . Will their students be willing and ready to take an active place in
a participatory system, or will they fall back on authoritarianism as humans
are wont to do during periods of social stress? Educators will play no small
role in determining whether or not their students will fall back on established
authority (protectionist democracy) or attempt to govern themselves. It is
our job to make the schools islands of decency, where students learn the real
meaning of democracy through lived experiences and examples so that they
might gain the civic courage to live democratically in a potentially undemo-
cratic society .
Endnotes
1 . The author would like to acknowledge the thoughtful comments provided by Lawrence
Metcalf, Ralph Page, Jack Nelson, and the three TRSE reviewers on this manuscript. While
total responsibility (or blame) for the manuscript is the author's alone, these individuals'
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careful and considered review greatly assisted with the development of the ideas herein . Addi-
tionally, I would like to acknowledge the intellectual debt owed to Lawrence Metcalf. His
tireless campaigning for social studies education which would seriously address the crucial
issues of our time and would work to produce real democrats has had an impact on many of us
in the field that often goes unstated . Thank you, Larry .
2 . The following discussion of democratic theory draws heavily upon the work of Carole
Pateman (1970) . Her excellent work in the area of democratic theory is considered a classic in
the field and readers are encouraged to consult that work for greater detail than is provided
herein .
3 . To claim one vision or theory of democracy to be "truer" to the original intent of our
cultural heritage is most certainly tenuous business . For example, in practice our democratic
origins included the exclusion of women and blacks from the political process . If, however, it is
fair to claim that our entire cultural heritage is based upon the expansion of political rights and
freedoms then participatory theory does seem to have a more legitimate claim to our loyalties
than does protectionist theory. Organzing social life along the lines of a participatory democ-
racy moves us along a continuum toward the more as opposed to the less democratic . Social
institutions come under more direct as opposed to representative control and the process of
governing is broadened to embrace the widest possible number of participants (see Deethart,
1983). Certainly this comes closer to a government of, by, and for the people than does our
current "elected autocracy" (Lucas, 1976) .
4 . The ideas are more fully explored in Giroux (1938b) and Wood (1982, 1984) and are only
briefly treated here . Readers are advised to see either of the above for a fuller treatment .
5 . The paradox referred to has been dealt with in greater detail by a variety of writers in-
cluding Counts (1932), Dewey (1916), DeLone (1979), Cohen and Rogers (1983), Wood (1984),
and Giroux (1983a) . Additionally, Ryan (1982) explores in detail the meaning of the term
"equality" as used in public practice and our collective self-history . Given limits of space, this
discussion will not be completely repeated herein and readers are advised to turn to the above
sources for a fuller account of the paradox between capitalism and democracy .
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Teaching concepts has long been a central concern of social educators. It
has received more attention in recent decades, and this seems to have coin-
cided with renewed research on concepts by psychologists in the 1950's
(Bourne et al, 1979, p . 169). In particular, the work of Bruner and others
(Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956) has influenced the development of nu-
merous materials, guidelines and approaches to facilitating social concept
learning .
Despite these efforts, a great deal of confusion remains regarding how to
best teach social concepts (Martorella, 1971, Stanley, 1984) . Teaching social
concepts requires attention to a variety of important factors, e .g. how con-
cepts are structured (the type of concept), the way concepts are formed, and
developmental considerations . All these factors, and more, shape and con-
strain proposed instructional strategies . In this paper we will review some of
the significant recent research on concept structure and formation and
discuss the implications for social education .
Current Approaches to Teaching Social Concepts
One can identify prevailing views regarding the structure and formation
of concepts in contemporary social education (Stanley, 1984). In general,
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social studies educators have tended to use a definition of concepts that has
been widely accepted by psychologists, i .e ., a concept is " . . . a class or
category all the members of which share a particular combination of critical
properties not shared by any other class" (Markle and Tiemann, 1970,
p. 54). This traditional or "classical" definition of concepts has had a signifi-
cant influence on how concepts have been presented for instruction in social
studies methods textbooks .
A recent study of thirty-seven social studies methods texts indicated some
variation of the classical definition of concepts was used by all the authors
who defined concepts (Stanley, 1984) . None of the texts discussed recent
research on the structure or formation of concepts which challenges the
viability of the traditional definition . Consequently, the suggested strategies
for teaching social concepts are, with rare exceptions, based on the classical
definition and involve teaching directly or having students discover the rule
defining the concept and its discrete set of defining attributes .
These strategies are linked to certain assumptions regarding how one
forms concepts and can also be traced to the early work of Bruner and
others (Bruner et al., 1956) . Their research concluded that people used
systematic hypothesis-testing strategies to discover an unknown concept .
Other psychologists have modified and extended Bruner's early ideas
(Bower & Trabasso, 1963, 1964 ; Douglass & Bourne, 1971 and Levine,
1975) . At present, one could make the case that " . . . hypothesis theory is
probably the most widely accepted account of how people solve concept
problems or acquire new concepts" (Bourne et al ., 1979, p . 164) .
It is not surprising that social educators should have been so strongly in-
fluenced by these psychological paradigms . Actually, the work of Bruner
and others was indicative of a switch from an earlier stimulus-response
(S-R) associationistic theory to a cognitive, information-processing view of
concept learning . The associationistic orientation toward learning was also
strongly rejected by Hunt and Metcalf (1968) in their methods text, which
first appeared in the mid-1950's . These views seem to have influenced a
number of other social educators over the years (e.g. Taba, 1969 ; Mar-
torella, 1976 ; Ehman et al ., 1974; Nelson & Michaelis, 1981 ; Fraenkel,
1982) .
Given these prevailing influences regarding how we should teach social
concepts, it is relevant to examine the recent research in this area . We turn
first to research on the structure of concepts .
The Structure of Concepts
A detailed analysis of the classical definition of concepts has been
presented by Smith and Medin (1981) . Those supporting the classical view
have held that " . . . all instances of a concept shared common properties,
and . . . these common properties were necessary and sufficient to define the
concept" (pp . 1-2) . This definition rests on three fundamental assumptions .
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First, concepts are summary representations, i.e ., they describe an entire
class of phenomena, " . . . rather than a set of descriptions of various subsets
or exemplars of that class" (p . 23). For example, the concept island is
generally defined as a body of land surrounded by water . In teaching the
concept, we would concentrate first on those characteristics common to all
islands as opposed to unique descriptions of specific instances. However,
the summary representation is derived inductively from examination of spe-
cific instances and should apply to all possible specific instances regardless
of their additional nonnecessary features (e .g ., palm trees, huts, or sand) .
The second assumption holds that the " . . . features that represent a con-
cept are (1) singly necessary and (2) jointly sufficient to define that concept"
(p. 27). Put another way, every instance of the concept must have each
defining feature and all phenomena having that set of features are examples
of the concept. Thus, to use our example, all islands must be bodies of land
and surrounded by water, and all bodies of land surrounded by water are
islands .
The third assumption holds that, "If concept X is a subset of concept Y,
the defining features of Y are nested in those of X" (p . 24). Thus desert
islands with some unique features will be a subset of the general concept
island and must contain the defining properties, "body of land" and "sur-
rounded by water" .
These three assumptions represent the strongest version of the classical
view, and reflect how that view has been employed by most social educators .
However, there are a number of significant questions regarding this defini-
tion, and these relate directly to social concepts . In fact, most important
social concepts are highly complex and connotative ; thus, they present great
difficulties for the classical view . But for now, we will focus mainly on those
limitations on the classical view which seem to apply to more concrete natu-
ral object concepts such as plants, animals and human artifacts . If the
classical view fails to account for the structure of these less abstract con-
cepts, by inference, it will apply even less well to highly abstract social con-
cepts .
Among the most serious problems for the classical view are the possible
existence of disjunctive concepts, the failure to identify specific defining
features of concepts, and empirical data on typicality effects . To the extent
each of these problems is valid, it undermines or refutes the classical defini-
tion of concepts .
The possible existence of disjunctive concepts is especially important,
because, if true, it " . . . comes closest to offering an inprinciple argument
against the classical view" (p . 32). Disjunctive concepts are those for which
there is no single set of necessary and sufficient defining features . For exam-
ple, one instance of the concept might be defined by the following features
X1, X2 , and X 3 , another by X2, X3, X 4 , and a third by X 5 , X6 , and X7 . 1
Thus, instances of a concept can be partially or totally disjunctive . In either
case, this violates the assumptions of the classical view .
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Ironically, some of those most closely associated with the classical defini-
tion of concepts also accept the existence of disjunctive concepts (Bruner et
al ., 1956; Hunt & Hovland, 1960) . Given Bruner's influence, it is not sur-
prising that many social educators assume disjunctive concepts do exist
(Stanley, 1984) . Furthermore, the abstract nature of social concepts makes
it logical to assume that many are disjunctive, e.g ., citizens may or may not
have the feature "native born ." The problem is that few social educators
have indicated a sensitivity to the difficulties caused by the existence of dis-
junctive concepts for the classical view and instructional strategies (Mar-
torella, 1976 Ch 4, 5 & 6 ; Stanley, 1984) .
Empirical Findings
A number of empirical studies offer evidence for the existence of disjunc-
tive concepts. Among the most significant is the research by Rosch (1976) .
Rosch and her colleagues have asked subjects to list features of concepts
which are classified at different levels, i .e ., superordinate (e.g ., furniture),
basic (e.g ., chair) and subordinate (e .g, kitchen chair). These studies
demonstrated that the superordinate level concepts have few or no features
common to all members (Rosch, 1976; Rosch and Mervis, 1975) . Rosch's
findings have been confirmed for natural concepts (Hampton, 1979) and
for more abstract concepts (Hampton, 1981) . The latter are of special rele-
vance to social educators .
A number of other studies have concluded that a simple conjunctive,
feature-based definition of concepts is not adequate . Labov (1973) has
noted the failure of subjects to specify a set of features to define a relatively
simple concept, "cup ." Similarly, Markman and Siebert (1976) have in-
vestigated concepts that concern collections (e.g ., pile, bunch, family) and
found them to be resistant to definition in terms of common features . Such
observations have led cue validity theorists (e .g ., Bourne & Restle, 1959 ;
Haygood & Bourne, 1960; Franks & Bransford, 1971 ; and Neumann, 1974,
1975) to propose probabilistic sets of features as an alternative to lists of
defining (necessary) features . From this point of view, the concept is fully
defined by "a set of features, their probability values, and the relationship
among the features" (Bourne, Dominowski, & Loftus, 1979) . As Milward
(1980) notes, almost any attempt to define a concept based on common ele-
ments "is easily contradicted with some special example" (p . 256) .
However, the findings of Rosch and others regarding disjunctive con-
cepts could be interpreted in another way . Perhaps the core of superor-
dinate level concepts have highly abstract or functional features which " . . .
can only be instantiated disjunctively at the perceptual level" (Smith &
Medin, 1981, p . 28). Thus, while disjunctive features might be listed at the
perceptual level, the core of superordinate concepts could be conjunctive
and consistent with the classical view .
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Unclear Cases
This raises a related concern, i .e ., the existence of unclear cases of a con-
cept. According to the classical view, we should be able to clearly determine
if one concept is a subset of another, because each subset must contain all
the necessary defining features . But at times it is difficult to make such
determinations (e.g ., is a Euglean an animal or plant ; is a tomato a fruit) .
Several researchers have demonstrated the failure of subjects to agree
whether an instance of a concept is a subset of another concept (McCloskey
& Glucksberg, 1978 ; Hampton, 1979, 1981) .
As is the case with disjunctive concepts, the data supporting unclear cases
is not conclusive . A basic problem is whether features listed by subjects are
valid indicators of the true features of concepts . The studies by Rosch and
by Hampton are based on such feature lists . If the subjects have an in-
complete understanding of the concepts in question, it is not surprising that
they would fail to list all the necessary features . Still, as Smith and Medin
(1981) noted, "such incomplete concepts could not be too incomplete, . . .
since adults obviously do a good job of using their concepts in dealing with
their environment" (p . 29) .
A similar explanation for unclear cases is offered by Glass and Holyoak
(1975). They posit that concepts have a common and technical definition . If
a number of people hold the common definition of a concept, they will fail
to categorize it correctly in accordance with the more accurate technical
definition (e.g ., whales will be perceived as fish) . Nevertheless, although the
data on disjunctive concepts and unclear cases are inconclusive, they are not
easily dismissed .
More damaging evidence against the classical view of concepts is pro-
vided by the general failure to specify defining features for most concepts .
The dimensions of most concepts are " . . . hard to specify and may them-
selves be made up of subtle combinations of underlying dimensions . The
dimensions are typically continuous rather than discrete, and they may not
be entirely independent of one another," (Bourne et al ., 1979, p . 196). A
significant amount of evidence indicates that people view concepts holisti-
cally, i .e ., in terms of their best examples or prototypes (Rosch, 1973, and
1975) and not in terms of discrete sets of necessary and sufficient features .
The view that prototypes represent categories has a long history in the
field of philosophy . The most influential work in this area is Wittgenstein's
(1953) on natural concepts . He noted the continual failure to determine
defining features and concluded that they simply do not exist for most con-
cepts .
A considerable amount of psychological research supports Wittgenstein's
views (e.g ., Posner & Keele, 1968 ; Reed, 1972 ; Franks & Bransford, 1971 ;
Rosch, 1973, 1975 ; Rosch & Mervis, 1975 ; Rosch et al., 1976; and Hamp-
ton, 1979, 1981) . In fact, Rosch and Mervis (1975) borrowed Wittgenstein's
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term "family resemblance" to indicate that some members of category are
viewed as more typical in terms of the extent to which they resemble a pro-
totype of the category .
As noted above, subjects asked to list concept features gave very few
which were true of all members of a category (Rosch 1976) . However, the
more an instance of a concept has attributes in common with other
members of a category, the higher typicality ratings it is given by subjects .
The most typical examples of any category have many more attributes in
common than those instances rated least typical of the category . Thus,
when a subject is asked to think of the best examples or prototypes of a con-
cept, the illusion of common attributes is likely to occur . According to
Rosch and Mervis (1975), it is this effect which gives common sense credibil-
ity to the classical view .
Another point worth considering is the failure of efforts to identify defin-
ing features for many concepts in the sciences (e.g., Simpson, 1961 ; Sokal,
1974). If these attempts fail, it is not surprising that they will fail in
psychological studies of natural concepts. This failure to specify defining
features is even more likely to be true of abstract concepts such as those in
social education, " . . . for no mathematician or metaphysician has come
even close to constructing a classical-view discription of such concepts"
(Smith & Medin, 1981, p . 5). Hampton (1981) is one of the few to do an ex-
periment to assess the structure of abstract concepts, and his data tend to
confirm the findings of Rosch regarding natural object concepts .
Typicality
The experimental data on typicality effects presents another strong case
against the validity of the classical view of concepts . These effects indicate
that exemplars of concepts are ordered in a continuum from worst (least
typical) to best (most typical) examples of a concept . For instance, a dog is a
good example of the concept "mammals", but a whale is a poor example .
This natural ordering of exemplar typicality is not predicted by the classical
theory, because, it would hold that either an item has the defining features
or it does not . There should be no basis for selecting better or worse ex-
amples of a concept .
The following additional findings related to typicality (or prototypicality)
effects appear to be damaging for the classical view : 1 . the relationship be-
tween typicality ratings and the distribution of features among exemplars of
a concept ; 2. subject's use of nonnecessary features to categorize concepts ;
and 3. the existence of cases where subjects judge a subset of a concept to be
more similar to a distant than to an immediate superordinate (Smith &
Medin, 1981, p . 50) .
Given that subjects can readily and consistently rate exemplars of a con-
cept on how typical they are of the concept (e.g ., Rosch, 1975), Rosch and
Mervis (1975) investigated the psychological baisis for these judgements . In
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experiments where subjects listed features for a number of different in-
stances of a concept, the investigators found a strong correlation between
the number of features shared by other instances of a concept (a measure of
family resemblance) and the rated typicality of an instance. In other words,
the typicality of an instance does not depend on only a few defining
features, as suggested by the classical theory . Rather it depends on the sum
of total features (most of which are shared by only a few instances of the
concept) shared with other members of the concept .
These results supporting a -family resemblance structure of concepts have
also been confirmed in experiments using artificial concepts (e .g ., letter
strings) . These strings were constructed so that no single feature was com-
mon to all exemplars. However, the strings did vary significantly in terms of
their resemblance (i .e ., the sum total of attributes shared with other in-
stances) . As in the case of natural concepts the family resemblance measure
was highly correlated with typicality ratings (Rosch, Simpson and Miller,
1976; Rosch and Mervis, 1975) . All these results are inconsistent with the
classical view, and attempts to save the view by positing ad hoc processing
assumptions are unsatisfactory (Smith & Medin, 1981, p . 43) .
Evidence for the use of unnecessary features in the process of categoriza-
tion constitutes another challenge to the classical view (Hampton, 1979) . In
Hampton's studies, subjects listed features of natural concept instances
which were not required to define the concept (e.g ., flies for bird). The
presence of these nondefining features correlated with the time required to
classify an item as an instance of the concept. Thus, these features were
significantly related to categorization performance of subjects, despite the
fact that they were not defining features of the concept .
Other evidence exists for the use of unnecessary features in categorization
(Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973 ; Caramaza, Hersch & Torgerson, 1976 ;
Shoben, 1976) . In multidimensional scaling studies, subjects were asked to
rate how closely related a number of exemplars of a concept were to their
superordinate (e.g ., how closely are chicken, duck and robin related to each
other and to bird, their superordinate category) . Rips et al. (1973) con-
tended that concepts have two sets of features "defining" and "characteris-
tic." The latter type (e.g., flies for bird) are similar to the nonecessary
features described by Hampton (1979) and are used in the categorization
process. This "feature comparison model" explains why typical instances of
a concept are categorized more quickly in terms of the degree of overlap of
both defining and characteristic (nonecessary) features (Bourne et al ., 1979,
pp. 114-115) .
A variety of arguments have been made to defend the classical view of
concept structure . In general, they are not convincing and of limited value . 2
For example, "accepting that nonnecessary features are used in categoriza-
tion is beginning to seem more parsimonious than accepting the arguments
needed to salvage the classical views" (Smith & Medin, 1981, p . 46). Other
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arguments fail to account for a number of significant findings, are not ade-
quately constrained, or modify the classical view to the point where it loses
its distinctiveness as a model for concept structure (Smith and Medin, 1981,
p. 60) .
Concept Formation
As noted earlier, there is also a prevailing view of concept formation or
processing, i .e., the hypothesis-testing model (Bourne, et al ., 1979, p . 163) .
This model is well supported by a long line of research (Bruner, et al ., 1956 ;
Restle, 1962; Bower & Trabasso, 1964 ; & Levine, 1975) .
The hypothesis-testing model views the concept learner as an active prob-
lem solver during the concept formation process . The learner continuously
generates and tests hypotheses about the rule or pattern of attributes defin-
ing the concept. Each successive hypothesis is tested by using it to classify
items as instances or noninstances of the concept . Whenever a hypothesis is
unsuccessful in classifying an item, it is rejected and a new hypothesis is
generated until the correct hypothesis is discovered .
This model, in conjunction with the classical definition of concepts, has
provided the psychological paradigm for most of the instructional strategies
presented in social studies methods texts (Stanley, 1984) . In sum, most
methods texts define concepts as having necessary and sufficient sets of
features organized by a specific rule . This rule is the hypothesis students
must discover or be taught .
Despite the solid laboratory support for the hypothesis-testing model,
there are considerable grounds to question the applicability of this approach
to concept learning in the social studies classroom. The type of concept
employed in these laboratory experiments is usually very simple, in stark
contrast to the highly abstract concepts of natural language . Consequently,
such research has been criticized for its apparent lack of concern for the
complex structure of natural concepts (Rosch, 1973, 1975, 1976) .
Furthermore, the time frame in which a laboratory concept is acquired is
generally very short. Being a novel experience for subjects, their motivation
is usually very high and their attention highly focused on the task of dis-
covering the concept . The pattern of experience with exemplars of a concept
is also very systematic (e.g ., a new exemplar of a concept is shown on each
trial). In addition most of the studies involve an inductive or discovery
strategy which " . . . may not be the usual or most important means of hav-
ing students learn concepts" (Montague, 1980, p . 305) . In real life, including
classrooms, none of these conditions is likely to occur on a regular basis .
Some researchers have discerned other possible approaches to concept
formation . Heidbreder (1924) noted that when a problem continued un-
solved for a long period of trials, subjects seemed to switch to a more
passive or "specator behavior." They were less concerned with generating
and testing hypotheses and more open to careful observation (perceptual
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processing) . This passive receptive mode might reflect a second method of
concept learning . Some have referred to this as "intuitive learning" (e.g .,
Bouthilet, 1948) others as "nonanalytic learning" (Reber, 1967 ; Brooks,
1978; Millward, 1980) . The common elements in this alternative processing
mode seem to be passive observation, more gradual learning, and an em-
phasis on memorization of exemplars rather than figuring out the rule
governing the concept (e .g., Brooks, 1978) .
The potential role of memory in concept formation is especially signifi-
cant. Brooks (1978) has demonstrated that learned exemplars of a concept
can be used to classify new items in the same category . In his view, these
new items are learned and categorized by comparing them to instances
stored in memory. Brooks had his subjects focus on and use information
related to single instances. They were not given rules or asked to look for
them. However, subjects were able to perform latter categorization tasks as
if they understood the rule, even though they were not conscious of it or
able to verbalize it . Brooks (1978) and Reber (1976) concluded that such
subjects have implicitly learned something about the rule via a nonanalytic
process. As Rosch and Lloyd (1978) noted, the " . . . storage of particular in-
stances provides a more suitable mechanism for the development of pro-
totypes" (p . 76) . In fact, Brooks' (1978) data indicate that asking subjects to
first learn a . rule suppressed other learning and " . . . performance on those
trials on which a rule was required" (p . 206) . Reber (1976) also found
evidence of the superiority of implicit over explicit learning, i .e ., when
hypothesis-testing instruction were given to groups, it interfered with the
implicit learning process of abstraction .
In real life, we tend to learn a great deal about a few examples of a con-
cept, and individual items potentially can be categorized into a large variety
of classes . In practice, we tend to categorize as soon as we learn about an in-
stance, and memory is important if we are to use this information at a latter
time to process new instances (Brooks, 1978) . Furthermore, there are a
number of reasons to believe that people are likely to store a prototype of a
category even in cases where only a single member of a category is stored
(Rosch & Mervis, 1975 ; Rosch, 1977 ; Kuhn, 1970) .
Millward (1980) claims that the hypothesis-testing or rule model paradigm
is actually inappropriate for studying concept formation . It does not appear
to describe accurately the learning that occurs in most studies of concept
formation. Many of these studies only require stimulus identification and
not classification which would be checked by hypothesis testing . Of those
studies involving classification, the rule is often very complex and difficult
to learn .
Furthermore, hypothesis-testing models imply all-or-none learning. The
strategy is explicit and generates specific propositions to guide the subject's
responses . Yet this is inconsistent with the gradual improvement of perfor-
mance and implicit processes noted in many studies (e .g ., Reber, 1967) . On
the other hand,
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. . . if subjects built up a series of conditional rules -no one of which
was totally correct, but each of which correctly handled some in-
dividual conditions -learning could progress gradually, even according
to a hypothesis-testing model ." (Millward, 1980, p. 258)
But such a process is quite different from the one generally posited by ad-
vocates of the traditional hypothesis-testing model .
Aside from hypothesis-testing models being inappropriate for much
research on concept formation, Rosch and Mervis (1975) and Hampton
(1979) have demonstrated that for most natural concepts, simple general
rules will not work to describe members of the category . Instead, a " . . .
general rule defining a category would have to consist of the disjunction of
a large number of conjunctive attribute sets. Carried to extremes, such a
rule would then begin to specify individual exemplars and therefore ap-
proach an exemplar model" (Millward, 1980, p . 259) .
Another theory of concept formation has been offered by Nelson (1974) .
In her view, the definition of a concept is not determined by attributes
alone. Nelson uses the example of a young child who sees a ball for the first
time. This "single incident" is normally sufficient for the child to form a
concept of ball. After this single experience the child will have eposodic-
type memories which include actions and expectations . These memories
constitute more than a mere rule-related cluster of features concerning the
concept. It is what Nelson calls the "functional core" of the concept, i .e., a
combination of features, actions, and how the concept relates to other con-
cepts .
According to Nelson, individual objects (e .g., dog, bug) and recognized
when they are encountered and before their concepts are actually fully
formed. Thus recognition of a new instance does not depend on a previous
encounter with more than one instance of the concept or require that multi-
ple instances can be distinguished from one another . For Nelson, the con-
cept formation process has three parts : (1) locating the identifying at-
tributes; (2) developing the functional core ; and (3) establishing scripts .
Knowing the attributes enables a person to use a concept out of context .
The functional core is based on how a concept is used (e.g. ball is for throw-
ing). All these factors serve to organize the concept into the larger frame-
work of relations with other concepts (e.g ., baseball games) .
Thus, a concept is more than a set of attributes of instances that meet the
rule and more complex than the rule itself . To know a concept's meaning
" . . . is to be able to construct routines that involve the concept in a ap-
propriate way, that is, routines that take advantage of the place [the
concept] occupies in an organized system of concepts" (Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976, pp . 128) .
Millward (1980) posited a computational theory of concept formation
which accounts for learning abstract concepts such as one finds in social
education . Millward relies on the term "schemata" which is derived, directly
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or indirectly, from the works of a number of researchers in psychology, ling-
uistics, and artificial intelligence (e .g ., Nelson 1977 ; Minsky, 1974 ; Schank,
1975; Bobrow and Norman, 1975 and Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977) . This
work holds that one learns about a concept via experiences which are coded
by elaborate mental entities, i .e ., frames, scripts and schemata . These terms
overlap sufficiently to permit Millward (1980) to use schemata to represent
the other two .
It is impossible to form abstract concepts solely on the basis of features .
Millward uses a few sentences about a birthday party to illustrate this point,
but the same could be said for a brief discription of an election, a civil rights
demonstration, or many other social studies concepts . We must make a
number of inferences to understand such discriptions . For all such concepts
" . . . we have special frames, sequences of expectations, actions, facts, rules
of behavior and so forth, and when the term (for the concept) is used, these
frames are called out to be matched to the current state of the world" (Mill-
ward, 1980, p. 262). These matches do not have to be perfect and there
are cognitive options for adjusting incorrect assumptions . Thus the learner
" . . . looks for certain kinds of contexts and uses frames to inject reasons,
motives, and explanations for them" (p . 262). this schemata definition of
concepts " . . . has no simple rule based on features, no set of defining
features, and no prototype" (p . 262). A large part of the concept could be
based on experience with a single instance, as Brooks (1978) and Nelson
(1977) have maintained .
Millward 1980 also bases his theory of concept formation on a number of
signficiant psychological contrasts . Among the most important is episodic
versus generic memory. Episodic memory refers to the storage of ex-
periences in exect terms of time, space, and context (e.g ., the memory of the
1980 election results) . Semantic memory involves the meaning of words or
concepts with no memory of the context in which such meanings were ac-
quired (e.g ., being able to define "election") . Concept formation can be
conceived of as the " . . . transformation of information from an episodic to
a generic representation" (Millward, 1980, p . 263) . However, all episodic
memory does not have to disappear and can be stored separate from the
general meaning of the concept .
Millward (1980) posits a process of building schemata from episodes (p .
263) . He believes the young child lacks appropriate concepts and must form
them. In the main, young children are guided by schemata which are inap-
propriate. Thus their behavior tends to be inefficient and experiences might
be encoded in a way not suitable for latter data retrieval . In this naive state,
" . . . learning is gradual, memory is partial, and reconstruction of ex-
perience nearly impossible" (p. 266) .
Repeated experience will reduce naivete and expand the concept forma-
tion process. Existing schema may be modified to make them more effective
and efficient (e.g ., as when one moves to a different culture). Schemata
could also be reorganized into a hierarchical structure or new schemata
67
might be created . Millward uses the concept of "tipping" in a restaurant to
illustrate that " . . . simply adding more features to the existing concept is
not adequate, since in some cases, one has to generalize and, in other cases,
restrict the application of the schema" (p . 267). For example, the child must
learn that we don't tip at MacDonald's .
Millwards' computational theory of concept formation starts by assum-
ing that episodes are stored as a result of encoding by existing schemata .
New data activate schemata and every activated schema has a built-in " . . .
anticipatory function (goal oriented) that elicits other schemata" (p . 270) .
The " . . . schemata should not be thought of as fixed entities but rather as
dynamic structures constantly undergoing change . We are continually
debugging our schemata and modifying their sequence of actions to make
them function more efficiently" (p . 270) .
Given these recent findings on concept structure and formation, what can
one conclude? First, over the past two decades, two alternative views of
concept structure have emerged to contest the dominance of the classical
view, i .e ., the prototype of probablistic model and the exemplar model .
Both have guided recent research on concept formation .
The prototype model used by Rosch and others posits a unitary represen-
tation of a concept, as does the classical view . However, this prototype
model rejects the need for a set a necessary and sufficient features to define
concepts. Rather, it is a unitary representation based on " . . . some sort of
measure of central tendency of the instances, properties or patterns" (Smith
& Medin, 1981, p . 61) .
A second significant departure from the classical view is one which is not
unitary but defines concepts in terms of their best examples, i .e ., the "ex-
emplar" view (Smith & Medin, 1981, p . 61) . There is substantial evidence to
support both views, and each paradigm has enabled researchers to gain new
insights into the nature of concepts . However, at present there is good
reason to believe that a single concept can be (and may need to be) repre-
sented both probabilisticly and by exemplars . Developmental studies in-
dicate that young children might first represent and learn concepts in terms
of exemplars . But as children mature, they are more likely to use a more
abstract process and rely on summary or probablistic representations .
Therefore :
As long as they do not discard the exemplars, mature learners would
end up with both exemplars and a summary representation for the same
concept. It is even possible that this developmental sequence occurs to
some degree whenever adults learn a new concept -they first represent
the concept in tems of exemplars, but with additional experience they
form a summary representaiton as well . (Smith & Medin, p . 174) .
Regardless of the issues related to the superiority of the prototype, ex-
emplar, or some mixed view of concept structure the important point is that
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the evidence for the exemplar and prototype models is stronger than the
findings supporting the classical view (Smith and Medin, 1981) . 3 Conse-
quently we must consider how these findings impact on the process of social
education .
Implications for Social Education
The methods presented to teach concepts in most social studies methods
textbooks can be characterized by a prevailing reliance on the classical
'aradigm for concept structure and the hypothesis-testing model for con-
cept formation. These models also seem to orient concept learning research
in social education . This review of research suggests that social educators
should consider the incorporation of alternative models for research and
practice .
Specifically, we must rethink and modify the way concepts are defined
and analyze the implications for changing the strategies presently used to
teach them. This does not mean that either the classical definition of con-
cepts or the hypothesis-testing model for instruction should be abandoned .
Although evidence for alternative paradigms is increasing, these traditional
models still receive considerable research support, especially as they relate
to certain concepts and teaching situations (e.g ., Keil, 1979; McKinney,
Larkins, Burts & Davis, 1982; Smith & Medin, 1981) . Nevertheless, the
classical and hypothesis-testing models do not appear adequate to define or
teach many other concepts in social education .
To the extent that social education is limited to the traditional paradigms
it distorts the reality of concept structure and formation . Consider, for ex-
ample, how one might apply the classical definition to the concept of
ethnicity. A recent analysis of this concept identified fourteen features
which might define an ethnic group (Thurst om, 1980) . These features can
be combined in a great variety of ways so that Blacks, Mormans, and Ca-
juns are instances of the concept . No single set of features defines this con-
cept. The same is true of concepts like social class, alientation, justice,
poverty, and many others . In these cases, the boundary of the concept is not
clear and one can not always be certain of what is and is not an instance .
Actually, such concepts are often better defined in terms of degrees, i.e ., the
extent to which one is more or less poor, ethnic, alienated, just, etc . To
teach these concepts as if they have fixed definitions is to bias and distort
their meaning for students .
With other more concrete social concepts (e.g ., landforms, taxes, arable
land), one might still apply the classical definition and related instructional
strategies . In fact, even abstract concepts can be taught via the classical
definition, if certain limitations are recognized . For instance, a teacher
might state that "for purposes of this discussion, concept X was defined
as . . . ." At the least such stipulation lets students know that the actual
definition is more complex and needs further explanation . In fact, it could
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be noted that some concepts (e.g ., justice) are probably impossible to define
in any fixed or concrete way . These vague or "fuzzy boundry" aspects of
concepts could be explained gradually as students mature .
Consequently, it is essential that we begin to change the ways we train
prospective and practicing social studies teachers . This would include dis-
semination of the recent research on concept learning and suggestions for
applying alternative paradigms in instruction . Put another way, teachers
should learn about the traditional concept models and their limitations
while also learning how to apply the probabilistic and exemplar models .
In addition to clarifying the issues related to defining concepts, further
attention needs to be given to implementing teaching strategies which go
beyond the identification and classification of concepts . The latter are im-
portant skills, but as the schema theorists and others have indicated, one
really does not understand a concept adequately until it becomes clear how
it is used and how it relates to other relevant concepts . Some social educa-
tors have begun to address this issue, but we certainly could devote more
time to this area (e.g ., Aumaugher, 1981 ; Martorella, 1976) .
Finally, we need to reorient our research efforts . Researchers in social
education ought to begin to engage in basic and applied studies using the
probabilistic and exemplar paradigms, as well as concept processing models
other than hypothesis-testing . Research on how to form and teach concepts
in social education has been rather limited to date. Indeed, many of the
most popular instructional strategies used to teach social concepts have little
solid research support . What little research does exist is almost exclusively
based on the traditional concept paradigms . Such research should continue,
but there is a need to emphasize alternative paradigms to help gain a better
understanding of concepts and concept learning .
These recommendations only mark a starting point . The issues related to
the structure and formation of concepts are far from settled . However, cur-
rent research and practice remain roosted in questionable paradigms . Hasty
changes are not justified, but the process of reexamination and change
should be initiated .
Endnotes
1 . For example, an ethnic group might be defined by the attributes (national origin,
language, food) or (language, food, race) or (religion, customs, political beliefs) .
2 . A detailed explanation of these arguments in defense of the classical view is beyond the
scope of this study . Readers should consult Smith, E . E ., & Merdin, D . L . Categories and Con-
cepts . Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1981, for a full discussion and criticism of
such arguments .
3 . This article attempts to outline a representative sample of the research and major issues
related to concept structure and formation . It is by no means exhaustive . See for example Neil,
F. C . Semantic and Conceptual Development . Harvard University Press, 1979 ; Gholson, B .
The Cognitive-Developmental Basis of Human Learning : Studies in Hypothesis Testing . New
York: Academic Press, 1980; Kendler, T . S . A critical review of the cognitive-developmental
basis of human learning: Studies in hypothesis testing. Developmental Review, 1981, 1,
146-162.
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Books
John I. Goodlad. A PLACE CALLED SCHOOL-PROSPECTS tOR
THE tUTURE. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1984 .
Reviewed by Richard A. Diem, The University of Texas at San Antonio
Periodically scholars, commissions and various governmental agencies
devote large sums of time and money investigating the status of American
Education . Staff are hired, research designs tested, and press conferences
held heralding the start and conclusion of these projects . Their residue
usually entails critiques about methodology, interpretation of findings and
philosophical points of view ; all of which are presented in a variety of re-
views, articles, and papers at various scholarly gatherings .
During the past year a number of these reports have surfaced with most
of the aforementioned scenario repeating itself with each series of "status
papers ." All have some merit, but one, A Placed Called School by John I .
Goodlad, seems to rise above most of the others in terms of its intellectual
approach to the study of schooling, as well as its realistic appraisal of the
American educational system and will probably have a greater impact than
most of the other reports .
The basic approach to this massive study was quite simple . Namely, if
one wants to find out what's going on in schools one had best get inside
them, observe a multitude of behavior patterns within them, investigate
both internal and external environmental factors, and interview participants
engaged in the schooling process. The use of 38 different schools in 13
divergent communities yielded data that "was a continuum of 12 years of
schooling in each community." The number of classrooms visited (over
1,000) and the students, parents and teachers questioned (over 26,000) pro-
vided a strong basis upon which Goodlad could interpret the results of the
study and project its findings to schools throughout this country .
Data gathered during the research cycle ran the gamut from reports on
methodological constructs of classroom observation to curriculum evalua-
tions of art and global education. Commentaries, within the text, include
items ranging from expenditures on computers to the nature of grading and
evaluation practices . An overview of several of these that highlight prob-
lems and practices within the social studies, provides an insight into current
practices in schools, as well as Goodlad's projections for the future .
The structure and development of the social studies curriculum, as de-
scribed in the text, engages the reader with a frightening sense of deja vu .
The elementary social studies curriculum is described as the same expanding
horizons, or near to far, curriculum that has dominated the field for
decades and been noted in various reports commissioned by the National
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Science toundation and National Council for the Social Studies over the
past several years . Amorphous at best, it places heavy emphasis on geogra-
phy, history, map skills, and a knowledge of the American Indian .
Upper elementary and Junior High School teaching was found to be fac-
tually oriented with textbooks and evaluative structures reinforcing these
constants . Teaching activities that predominated, included listening,
reading, completing workbooks and worksheets and taking quizzes with a
noted avoidance of interactive problem solving activites .
The texts that are-used appear to be dry and heavily fact oriented . While
disparity in approach was noted at the Junior and Senior high school levels,
most displayed "a remoteness from real people living in a time and place ."
As disheartening, and repetitious to those conversant with recent studies
on curriculum, the above may seem, the items that are of particular note in-
clude findings that children's perceptions of social studies in this study were
highly negative. In the upper elementary schools, students favored social
studies less than any other subject . Students at the secondary level felt much
the same. In trying to understand these feelings Goodlad offers the follow-
ing: " . . . topics commonly included in the social studies appear as though
they would be of great human interest . But something strange seems to have
happened to them on the way to the classroom . The topics of study become
removed from their intrinsically human character, reduced to dates and
places readers will recall memorizing from texts ."
No explanatory notes are offered for these statements, although looking
at the data collected on teacher preparation, it would seem that teacher self
concept is not to blame. In fact only 4 .5% of the social studies teachers
queried indicated that they were not prepared to teach their subject . At the
same time, 75 076, of all teachers, in this study, stated that their teaching was
strongly influenced by experiental and student interest factors . These
figures and rationales point out a weakness in this study ; the inability to tie
together the data in concise summary statements .
There are suggestions offered to upgrade the classroom skills of teachers,
but most are not new . Increased emphasis on pedagogical training, better
and more supervision in student teaching experiences, closer relationships
between methodology and content, more research on actual classroom prac-
tices, and increased funding for teacher education are all items that have
been discussed and debated in various academic and governmental forums
over the past five years . What is different is a call for training pre-service
teachers in behavioral and humanistic studies related to schools . This ap-
pears to be a quasi-basic liberal arts education approach to the general
education of teachers . At the same time there is a proposal to increase
classroom observation at the pre-service level and a parallel development of
pre and inservice teaching skills .
The emphasis on inservice skill development is part of Goodlad's notion
of improving teaching through an overall increase in professional educa-
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tional skills and relationships . There are several ideas mentioned about
decreasing teaching loads, as in Japan, with a concomitant increase in cur-
riculum planning, development and other professional skills .
In the same spirit, there is also a plan to redesign the schooling process by
lowering entrance and exit ages . This would change schooling into a three
stage-developmental process divided, roughly, by ages 4 to 7, 8 to 11, and
12 to 15 . Parallel to this restructuring, school size would be pared down and
organized into vertical units of not more than 100 students at the lower
levels and 160 at the secondary . Curriculum would emphasize conceptual
and skill development . These would prepare the young for the fourth
educative continuum, higher education, and eventually establish educative
communities with local settings .
Any large scale study is open to criticism for what it says and what is un-
said. Most of the items that detract from this project are those things that
were either not stated or else dealt with in an extremely cursory manner . tor
example, there is little mention on how the schooling process can be
changed from one that filters and allocates its clients to one that weighs and
balances societal needs with equal opportunities . There are no real sugges-
tions for improvement of curriculum offerings, only an intangible notion of
using a conceptual-skill framework for teaching . Visions of the future fail
to account for the exciting possibilities, and restructuring of schools, that
microtechnology and interactive communications offer .
Taking all these into acount one is still left with the feeling that this docu-
ment needs to be read, discussed, and used as part of any discussion that en-
tails the schooling process in America circa the 1980's . In some respects it is
a grim indictment of a system that seems to accept mediocrity and "average-
ness" above high attainment . Yet it does end on a note of optimism and
change. One can only hope that the latter will prevail instead of the former .
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Cuban, Larry. HOW TEACHERS TAUGHT . Longman, New York, 292
pp., $27.50 .
Reviewed by Murry R . Nelson, Pennsylvania State University .
One of the greatest acknowledged shortcomings of curriculum research
and teacher education studies has been the lack of knowledge concerning
what really happens in classrooms . Much of the curriculum innovation of
the "New Social Studies" has ended up in closets in schools . Studies have
identified various reasons why innovation has not taken hold, but the data
is usually speculative or limited .
In recent years the study led by Goodlad's UCLA team on schooling has
received a great deal of commentary because of its depth, breadth and
classroom-based observational research . Other such studies such as Phil
Jackson's Life in Classrooms have also been regarded as extremely impor-
tant in providing a better picture of what classrooms are really like .
In How Teachers Taught, Larry Cuban illustrates why more studies of
classrooms have not been made as well as how important and interesting
such studies are to our knowledge of classroom life, curriculum change and
teacher education .
Cuban examined enormous amounts of varied data-school reports,
school surveys, photographs, newspaper articles, journal articles, inter-
district memos, and interviews . He combined this with his own observations
and personal interpretation of the data to present a picture of teachers and
students in the classroom setting in a variety of eras and environments .
These include New York, Washington, Denver and various rural outposts in
the period 1920-1940 and New York, Washington, North Dakota in the
period 1965-1980 .
One chapter that is quite different is on the schools of Arlington County,
Virginia from 1967-1980 . The differences is Cuban's perspective, since for
seven of those years he served as superintendent of the Arlington County
Schools . As he notes, a superintendent has tremendous accessibility to
classrooms and he spent one and one-half days per week in classroom obser-
vations . Much of the research for this chapter was drawn from those obser-
vations . Despite the "insider-ness" of the perspective, I found this chapter to
be the weakest and least interesting . Cuban's closeness to the subject seemed
to dilute the impact of the chapter .
I should note, however, that the Arlington chapter was the weakest in a
book of strong, at times bold, interpretation and writing . Despite many
disclaimers of obvious bias, Cuban puts forth clear, well documented
answers for the important questions that he asks, (e:g ., "How did teachers
react to changes in the field of education?", "How soon and to what extent
were such changes incorporated into various classroom routines? ", "How
much change was really seen?", "How long did it last, i .e ., did it become an
embedded part of classroom procedures? ") .
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As I noted, Cuban analyzed a number of data sources . Of particular
uniqueness was his examination of classroom photos from school reports,
the Library of Congress and other archives, some of which were included in
the book. Cuban "analyzed" the photos to determine more information on
class arrangement, group instruction, classroom activities and student
movement. tor example, a photograph of students at a blackboard all do-
ing the same assignment indicated teacher centeredness, large group instruc-
tion and a limited degree of student movement . (If fixed seating was included
in the photo, more limitations were put on degree of student movement .)
Cuban notes how subjective such speculative assessment is, but also notes
that the photographs were used to augment other data, not to provide con-
clusions derived solely from a photograph or two .
The final chapter in the book is the most vital, because Cuban takes his
data analysis of various eras and sites and tries to lay them on the problems
or situations existent in schools today . Generally Cuban finds that change
in schools occurs in a limited number of classrooms and change is either no
longer evident or considerably less marked within five years . He presents
five possible explanations for "the constancy of teacher centered instruc-
tion" (240) and analyzes the strength and flaws of each (240-246) . These ex-
planations are :
1) Schooling as Social Control or Sorting (basically preparation for the
real world of control) .
2) School and Classroom Structures (organizational efficiency) .
3) The Culture of Teaching (people attracted to teaching tend to reaffirm
not challenge the role of schools) .
4) Beliefs : Individual and Shared (e.g. Knowledge must be transmitted to
young people; the role of the school is to develop the mind and instill
social values) .
5) teckless implementation (simple lack of organizational effort in
reform) .
Cuban notes that teachers are frequently blamed for "poor" schooling,
but he also notes the limitations placed on teachers in real decision making,
(such as "how many and what students will be in class" and "how long the
school day or class period will be .") (252) .
In searching for ways to improve teacher performance, rather than the
assessment of instructional quality, Cuban offers "four strategies to
upgrade the quality of classroom instruction : revise selection policies in
schools of education and districts hiring teachers ; improve preparation pro-
grams for apprentices ; remove incompetents; retrain existing corps of
teachers." These suggestions are both thought provoking and realistic with
the force of Cuban's experience and research buttressing his ideas .
Despite data that generally indicates classrooms as unchanging, Cuban
remains optimistic because of the excellent teachers that he has seen or
learned of in his research . Rather than trying to shape teaching to fit our
understandings, it behooves us to shape our understandings to fit teaching .
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Concentrating upon what teachers can do well in classrooms, on what
schools can achieve effectively within certain boundaries is a sensible
response to the potent processes at work in schools . Labels such as
"teacher-centered," "traditional," "child-centered," and "open class-
rooms" may help researchers and promoters but they do what all labels
inevitably do : categorize and simplify . Such names help not a bit in
identifying, under what conditions, what will work with children in
boosting both academic performances and personal growth . (268)
Cuban's book has shown how historical research can be used in the
classroom ideas of today and what a rich variety of historical data is
available for research . There are problems, however, most of which Cuban
notes. Much of his work is interpretive and his interpretations could be
totally wrong . Thus, another researcher could come up with quite different
conclusions .
Another shortcoming is the concentration on certain eras and ideas . The
period 1940-1960 is almost totally ignored and some major innovative ideas
of the 20th century are not examined .
The biggest "problem" is not Cuban's, but the educational community .
As noted above there are clear gaps in Cuban's work . Using his techniques
(or variants), there is much more to be researched . The problem is that
publishers may not wish to pursue another study like this since it's "already
been done." Rather than broadening research, the risk of small minded
folks using this work to narrow research is very real . Let us hope that this
does note occur .
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Abstracts
Toward Emancipation in Citizenship Education : The Case of
African-American Cultural Knowledge
This article points to a body of knowledge found in scholarship born out of the
Black community's struggle against and resistance to American capitalism and
racism . In the paradigm advanced, an emancipatory form of citizenship education is
proposed employing as its pedagogical base this Afro-American cultural knowledge .
Such an advanced form of citizenship education would be concerned with social
reconstruction by advocating and actively helping students to become critical
thinkers and active societal participants. The paper examines the origins of such
knowledge and provides suggestions as to how it could be used in daily classroom ac-
tivities .
Teacher Authority in the Social Studies Classroom :
Erosion of a Barren Ground
The essential argument developed in the article is that the majority of social
studies teachers do not have the authority to teach the social studies curriculum . To
support this position, the nature of a teacher's classroom authority is examined in
terms of the teacher's right to be there (or `de jure' authority) and the legitimate
power (or `de facto' authority) to maintain that right . The primary problem facing
social studies teachers is that, because of their preparation perhaps, or their inap-
propriate in-service professional development, they do not have much sensible
understanding of the epistemological state of social studies knowledge . Such
understanding is the primary reason why students will not grant their teachers `de
facto' authority, and hence why social studies is regarded by students as one of the
most unpopular and irrelevant subjects in the school curriculum .
Education for Democratic Participation :
Democratic Values
Schooling in our democracy is caught in a paradoxical position . On one hand,
schools as public institutions are to serve the state and its needs . On the other,
democracy requires semi-autonomous citizens willing and able to make their own
value choices . This piece argues that this paradox is resolved by choosing either a
"protectionist" or "participatory" form of democracy . Taking the participatory
model, an outline of a curriculum for democratic participation is presented . One
facet of this curriculum, the teaching of democratic values, is examined in detail
through the example of a study of the nuclear freeze movement .
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Recent Research on Concept Learning :
Implications for Social Education
Proposals for teaching concepts have been dominated by traditional paradigms,
i .e ., a classical model of the structure of concepts and a hypothesis-testing model for
concept formation . Each has had a significant influence on social education . A
review of recent research on concept structure and formation reveals evidence for
alternative paradigms, e.g ., exemplar, probabilistic, and schematic models . The
research also indicates some problems regarding the traditional models . Implications
for relating alternative models to instruction in social education are discussed .
Correction
The Fall, 1984 issue of TRSE, Volume XII, Number 3, p .1, erroneously
identified Robert J . Gilbert as Rod Gilbert . ("Images of Society and the
Analysis of Ideologies in the Social Subjects")
89
Editorial Comment
The editorship of Theory and Research in Social Education is a three year
term. At times, that three years seems interminable ; at other times it seems
too brief. At this writing the three years seems about right. My term as
editor is complete with this issue .
This last issue of Volume 12 represents the combined efforts of a variety
of conscientious and thoughtful people who have given time, energy, and
care to the development of the journal over the past twelve years . CUFA
members, through dues and readership, provide a basis for TRSE . Scholars
willing to subject their manuscripts to rigorous review are particularly
significant to continued vitality . A group of careful reviewers, concerned
about journal and field quality, are essential to the maintenance of stan-
dards. Editorial Boards provide important advice on policy and editorial
decisions. Financial and moral support from NCSS has been crucial . And
the specific efforts of assistant editors, editorial assistants, secretaries and
other university staff who contribute to getting the journal work done, are
especially necessary . I thank all for their assistance and support these past
three years .
CUFA is fortunate in obtaining Professor Guy Larkins of the University
of Georgia as TRSE editor for Volumes 13, 14, and 15 . Guy is a productive
scholar, and a particularly adept reviewer of TRSE manuscripts . His selec-
tion for the Editorship is a tribute to the journal, the Search Committee and
the CUFA Board . I look forward to continued improvement in TRSE through
Guy's leadership .
Jack L . Nelson
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Journal Information
Theory and Research in Social Education is designed to stimulate and
communicate systematic research and thinking in social education . The pur-
pose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas and research findings
that will expand knowledge about purposes, conditions, and effects of
schooling and education about society and social relations .
We welcome manuscripts on a variety of topics including :
Purposes of social education ;
Models, theories, and related frameworks concerning the development,
diffusion, and adoption of curricular materials ;
Instructional strategies ;
The relation of the social sciences, philosophy, history and/or the arts to
social education ;
The politics, economics, sociology, social psychology, psychology, an-
thropology, philosophy, and/or the history of social education ;
Alternative social organizations and utilizations of the school for social
education ;
Comparative studies of alternative models of social education ;
Models of and research on alternative schemas for student participation
and social action ;
Relationship of different pre- and in-service patterns of teacher training
to social education ;
Models of the utilization of objectives in social education and related re-
search findings ;
Implications of learning theory, child development research, socialization
and political socialization research for the purposes and practice of social
education ;
The relationship of different independent, explanatory variables to edu-
cational achievements in the area of learning about society and social re-
lations ;
The social climate and cohesion of schools and other school characteris-
tics as independent, explanatory variables predicting general achievement .
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Submission of Manuscripts
In order to facilitate the processing and review of manuscripts, authors are
asked to follow these procedures :
1 . Manuscripts should be typed with a dark ribbon or clearly mimeo-
graphed, multilithed, or photocopied . Some corrections in dark ink will
be accepted .
2 . Four copies of each manuscript should be submitted .
3 . The author's name and affiliation should appear on a separate cover
page, along with an abstract of approximately 100 words .
4 . Only the title of the article should appear on the first page of the manu-
script .
5. All text, references, abstracts and endnotes should be double-spaced .
Manuscript Style
1 . When citations are made, the name of the author, publication date, and
any necessary page number should be enclosed in parentheses and lo-
cated directly in the text . The complete reference should be included in
section labeled "References ."
For example; "Teachers commonly assume that students must acquire
background information before they can be expected to think or to
test their insights ." (Hunt and Metcalf, 1968, p . 54)
2. Endnotes should not be used to cite references . Substantive endnotes
should be numbered sequentially and inserted in text .
3. References should_ be alphabetized and located at the end of the manu-
script. The reference list should contain only those sources which are
cited in the text. Examples of references to a chapter in an edited work, a
book, and a journal article follow .
Ehman, Lee H. and Hahn, Carole L . "Contributions of Research To
Social Studies Education ." In Howard D. Mehlinger and O . L .
Davis, Jr . (Eds.), The Social Studies, Eightieth Yearbook of the Na-
tional Society for the Study of Education . Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981 .
Hunt, Maurice P . and Metcalf, Lawrence E . Teaching High School
Social Studies (2nd ed.) . New York: Harper & Row, 1968 .
Egan, Kieran . "John Dewey and the Social Studies Curriculum." The-
ory and Research in Social Education . 1980, 8, 37-55 .
4. Each table and/or figure should be placed on a separate page and placed
in a separate section at the end of the manuscript . Arabic numerals
should be used for numbering both figures and tables, and their location
in the text should be indicated by the following note :
Table/Figure	 about here .
5 . Send manuscripts to :
	
A. Guy Larkins
100 Dudley Hall
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30602
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Subscription Information
A subscription to Theory and Research in Social Education may be ob-
tained by membership in the College and University Faculty Assembly of
the National Council for Social Studies . Membership information is avail-
able from the Membership Department, NCSS, 3501 Newark St ., NW,
Washington, D.C ., 20016. Institutional and non-CUFA subscriptions are
$25 .00 per year, foreign subscriptions $35 .00. Write to the Editor for these
orders .
Back Issues/Reprints
Back issues may be obtained for $4 .95 each and reprints of individual arti-
cles (beginning with Volume 7) are available . Write to the Editor for these
orders ; do not send payment until advised of availability of issue/reprint .
Change of Address/Missing Issues
Send change of address notices and a recent mailing label to the Editor as
soon as new address is known . Also send queries about missing issues to the
Editor . Be sure to include a complete, proper address with such queries .
Advertising
Information about advertising will be sent upon request .
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